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SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE SPOTLIGHT: THE
INCREASINGNEED TO IMPROVE PUBLICLY-HELD
COMPANIES’ CSR AND ESGDISCLOSURES
Thomas Lee Hazen*
ABSTRACT
There is ever-increasing investor interest in corporate social
responsibility (CSR) generally, and environmental social governance (ESG)
in particular. Investors’ desires have triggered increased corporate ESG
disclosures to indicate companies’ commitment to socially responsible
behavior. As pressure for ESG-related disclosures continues to rise, there is
increasing pressure on the SEC to support and mandate enhanced ESG
disclosures.
Notwithstanding many calls for mandatory ESG disclosures, the SEC
has not implemented such a requirement. Instead, ESG disclosures are
voluntary. Voluntary ESG disclosures are common, but to a large extent are
marred by a lack of standardization in ESG data methodology. The
increasing investor interest in ESG has led publicly held companies to take
various approaches in framing their ESG disclosures. Many observers have
asked the SEC to take a more active role with respect to ESG disclosures.
Some observers call for mandatory ESG disclosures. To date, the SEC’s
approach has been limited to providing guidance for companies electing to
make ESG disclosures. This article analyzes the various ways in which the
SEC could mandate or encourage better ESG disclosures. The article
concludes that regardless of whether the SEC imposes mandatory disclosures
or continues its voluntary approach, the SEC should adopt a safe harbor rule.
A safe harbor rule would encourage ESG disclosures while at the same time
limit, but not eliminate, the risk of liability for defective ESG-related
disclosures.
* Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law, the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last 90 years, scholars and policy makers have debated the
extent to which corporations should be engaging in socially responsible
behavior as part of their mission.1 Over the past several decades, corporate
1. See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1049 (1931) (arguing that corporate managers should be required to take into account
the interests of all shareholders); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932) (“[P]ublic opinion, which ultimately makes
law, has made and is today making substantial strides in the direction of a view of the business
corporation as an economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making
function, that this view has already had some effect upon legal theory, and that it is likely to
have a greatly increased effect upon the latter in the near future.”); Milton Friedman, The
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social responsibility (CSR) has had renewed vitality and increasing investor
interest. The emergence of environmental social governance (ESG)
provided a renewed focus on CSR by embracing the use of metrics2 to
measure a company’s commitment to socially responsible behavior.3 ESG
also specifically identifies three aspects of CSR–environmentalism or
sustainability, social responsibility generally, and a corporate governance
system that fosters CSR.4
The current wave of social protests and increased emphasis on social
justice are likely to spur even more interest in ESG and make reforms more
pressing. For example, the growth in social awareness increases consumer
boycotts,5 which in turn will encourage companies to focus more on their
social responsibilities and good corporate governance, including elimination
of toxic corporate culture and enhancement of diversity, inclusion, and
equity.6 Recent years have also witnessed increased concern over
Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits, THE NEW YORK TIMESMAGAZINE,
Sept. 13, 1970 (stating a corporation has one social responsibility – to maximize wealth for
its shareholders).
2. As they are commonly understood, “[m]etrics are measures of quantitative
assessment commonly used for assessing, comparing, and tracking performance or
production. Generally, a group of metrics will typically be used to build a dashboard that
management or analysts review on a regular basis to maintain performance assessments,
opinions, and business strategies.” Metrics Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investop
edia.com/terms/m/metrics.asp [https://perma.cc/JKK2-29NW].
3. See, e.g., Abhishek Vishnoi, Five Trends MSCI Sees in the Growth in Sustainable
Investing, BLOOMBERGGREEN (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20
20-01-16/here-are-five-trends-msci-sees-leading-growth-in-esg-investing [https://perma.cc/S
962-WGSQ] (discussing growth in ESG investing); Shane Blanton & Anna West, 2019 ESG
Survey, CALLAN INSTITUTE, https://www.callan.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2019-ESG
-Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK4J-HBAE] (visited Feb. 23, 2020); Billy Nauman, ESG
Money Market Funds Grow 15% in First Half, FINANCIAL TIMES (July 14, 2019), https://ww
w.ft.com/content/2c7b8438-a5a6-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04 [https://perma.cc/A8E3-B67E].
4. In another article, I explore the evolution of CSR over the past century and how the
law has reacted. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate and Securities Law Impact on Social
Responsibility and Corporate Purpose, 62 B.C.L. REV. 851 (2021) (examining the impact of
corporate and securities law on CSR). This article addresses the ways in which CSR and
ESG-related securities law reforms should be implemented.
5. For representative consumer boycotts, see, e.g., Boycotts, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.
nytimes.com/topic/subject/boycotts [https://perma.cc/SYJ9-GUKD] (last visited Aug. 1,
2020); Boycotts List, ETHICAL CONSUMER, https://www.ethicalconsumer.org/ethicalcampaig
ns/boycotts [https://perma.cc/WKW7-HUJG] (last visited Aug. 1, 2020).
6. See, e.g.,White & Case Client Memo (Aug. 7, 2020), ESG Takes Center Stage Amid
Economic Crisis and Social Unrest, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/esg-takes-center-sta
ge-amid-economic-10813/ [https://perma.cc/CJN2-7FY6] (“It is not only the environment
that is directing investor behavior and shaping corporate strategies and values. The
unequal impact of COVID 19 on the ‘have nots’ in society has been widely recognized.
This has been compounded by the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and protests,
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problematic corporate culture in terms of sexual harassment, discrimination,
and other problems. These developments have increased investor emphasis
on ESG and corporate culture.
There is a good deal of scholarly literature documenting the increasing
investor interest in CSR and ESG over the years.7 The push for more ESG
awareness by public companies was recently highlighted in an open letter
from BlackRock, a major investment manager, telling corporations to focus
on both sustainability and improved shareholder communication of
companies’ efforts on that issue.8 BlackRock has considerable company
among institutional investors who are also pressuring corporate America for
more meaningful commitment to ESG.9 Not everyone agrees that this is a
good trend,10 but it is undeniable that the trend is gaining increased traction.
which started at the end of May in the United States but quickly spread to Europe and
have shone a spotlight on persistent racial injustice and social inequality more broadly.”).
See also, e.g., Allison Herren Lee, SEC Commissioner Lee Discusses Regulation S-K and
ESG Disclosures, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 27, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.ed
u/2020/08/27/sec-commissioner-lee-discusses-regulation-s-k-and-esg-disclosures/ [https://pe
rma.cc/6UJR-99K8] (bemoaning the absence of required discussion of climate risk and
diversity).
7. See, e.g., Edouard Dubois & Ali Saribas, Making Corporate Purpose Tangible–A
Survey of Investors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 19, 2020), https://corpgo
v.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/19/making-corporate-purpose-tangible-a-survey-of-investors/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/N8T2-CW7H] (discussing survey showing investor interest in ESG and
metrics).
8. A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, BLACKROCK https://www.blackrock.com/uk
/individual/larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/TQM3-4NL3]. See, e.g., David A. Katz &
LauraMcIntosh, Sustainability in the Spotlight, HARV. L. SCH. FORUMONCORP.GOVERNANCE
(Jan. 27, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/27/sustainability-in-the-spotlight/
[https://perma.cc/N5Q4-B8WH] (discussing the Blackrock letter to CEOs).
9.
BlackRock is among many managers, including pioneering public employee
pension funds such as CalPERS and NYCERS, which started many years ago to
focus on companies’ social values as part of the fund’s investment strategy. In
addition to the many ESG oriented pension plans, it is estimated that there are
300 mutual funds and exchange traded funds that continue to attract increased
investor interest. In yet another significant development, Moody’s Investor
Service expects that ESG will be of increased importance in evaluating a
company’s credit risks.
Hazen supra note 4 at 858–59. Cf.Max. M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling
Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a
Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381 (2020) (demonstrating that trustees of trusts and pension funds
can make ESG investments consistent with their fiduciary duties).
10. For example, the National Center for Public Policy Research wrote an open letter
to BlackRock’s CEO, urging the need for economic recovery during the COVID-19 crisis as
a reason for focusing on shareholder primacy and profitability. NATIONALCENTER FOR
PUBLIC POLICYRESEACH (Apr. 15, 2020), Open Letter from the National Center on Public
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Another recent victory for activist shareholders occurred when Chevron’s
shareholders voted in favor of a shareholder proposal asking management to
report on its lobbying efforts regarding climate change and the Paris
Agreement on climate change.11
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the federal
regulatory agency charged with implementing and overseeing the federal
securities laws. Scholarly literature calling for increased SEC commitment
to CSR and its relevance to investors is not new.12 Similarly, there has been
an ongoing debate as to whether the purpose of corporations should be
limited solely to profit maximization.13 This article does not engage in the
debate over who the law should recognize as the true corporate
stakeholders,14 nor does it engage in the debate over the wisdom of increased
Policy to Lawrence Fink, Chief Executive Officer BlackRock, Inc., https://nationalcenter.org/
ncppr/2020/04/15/open-letter-to-blackrock-ceo-larry-fink/ [https://perma.cc/9PDA-RAPR]
(“This economic crisis makes it more important than ever that companies like BlackRock
focus on helping our nation’s economy recover. BlackRock and others must not add
additional hurdles to recovery by supporting unnecessary and harmful environmental, social,
and governance (ESG) shareholder proposals.”). BlackRock responded that COVID-19
does not negate the desirability of sustainable investing. See BlackRock (May 2020),
Sustainable Investing: Resilience Amid Uncertainty, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/l
iterature/investor-education/sustainable-investing-resilience.pdf [https://perma.cc/LW92-
W6UV]. See also, e.g., Stakeholder Principles in the COVID Era, WORLD ECONOMIC
FORUM (Apr. 2020), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Stakeholder_Principles_COVID
_Era.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7BH-2Z4X] (stressing the importance of commitment to
sustainability while focusing on stakeholders’ COVID-19 concerns).
11. See David Wethe & Kevin Crowley, Chevron Investors Rebuff Board in Climate
Lobbying Vote, BLOOMBERG LAW (May 27, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2020-05-27/chevron-investors-back-proposal-for-climate-lobbying-report [https://perma.cc/
278B-UWZS]). The Paris agreement can be found at https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/inte
rnational/negotiations/paris_en [https://perma.cc/EN8N-BMBD].
12. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Progress in the Art of Social Accounting and Other
Arguments for Disclosure on Corporate Social Responsibility, 29 VAND. L. REV. 539 (1976)
(suggesting that corporations conduct social audits to investigate the extent of their social
responsibility); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999) (suggesting that SEC
disclosure could increase corporate social transparency and have a positive effect on corporate
social responsibility). See also, e.g., RALPHNADER,MARKGREEN&JOELSELIGMAN, TAMING
THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976) (recommending laws requiring corporations to be socially
responsible).
13. See the authorities cited supra in note 1.
14. Compare, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuck & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of
Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORN. L. REV. 91 (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=3544978 [https://perma.cc/T6W9-6MFD] (claiming that stakeholderism
adversely impacts shareholders, stakeholders, and society generally); with, e.g., LYNNSTOUT,
THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS,
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 29 (2012) (“The notion that corporate law requires directors
. . . to maximize shareholder wealth simply isn’t true.”).
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ESG focus. Instead, recognizing the reality that CSR and ESG are here to
stay, the article addresses the ways in which the SEC can improve CSR and
ESG disclosures.
The article begins with a description of the current landscape of CSR
and ESG disclosures.15 This is followed by a brief overview of the securities
laws’ disclosure obligations.16 Next, the article explains materiality, a
concept that is the lynchpin of the securities laws’ disclosure requirements.17
The analysis of materiality is followed by exploration of the potential ways
the SEC could enhance CSR and ESG disclosures,18 including the
advisability of mandating disclosure19 or taking additional steps to encourage
voluntary disclosure.20
II. CSR AND ESG
CSR was the term first used by advocates of increased corporate social
responsibility to provide a shorthand description of their movement.21 CSR
reflects the general principle that companies should be mindful of the public
good and not simply be motivated by profit maximization.22 ESG developed
as a subcategory of CSR and uses a metrics-driven format to measure a
company’s commitment to social responsibilities.23
ESG’s basic premise is that metrics-driven data provides investors with
more meaningful information about a company’s commitment to the
environment and other socially relevant concerns. The term ESG has another
important impact on general CSR concepts. ESG identifies the three distinct
elements of CSR. The “E” focuses on a company’s environmental impact or
15. See infra text accompanying notes 35-45.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 46-66.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 67-105.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 106-150.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 151-216.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 217-250.
21. See, e.g., Mauricio Andres Latapi Agudelo, Lara Jóhannsdóttir & Brynhildur
Davidstóttir, A Literature Review of the History and Evolution of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 4 J. CORP. SOCIAL RESP. 1 (2019) (describing the history and development of
CSR); Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, 85 U. CIN. L. REV.
347 (2017) (discussing CSR’s origins).
22. See, e.g., John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish:
Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1
(2005) (studying how corporations and activists perceive the corporate social responsibility
movement).
23. George Kell, The Remarkable Rise of ESG, FORBES (July 11, 2018), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/07/11/the-remarkable-rise-of-esg/#575351571695 [https://
perma.cc/ME24-EL6Q] (describing the evolution of ESG).
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sustainability policies. The “S” addresses other socially important issues
including, for example, diversity and inclusion, paying reasonable living
wages to employees, fighting against discrimination, and public health
issues. The “G,” addresses the approach the company takes in corporate
governance, including, for example, use of independent directors, improved
monitoring of corporate operations, responsible hiring and promotion
practices, and the company’s approach to inclusion and diversity.
ESG has not replaced CSR as either a moniker or a concept, but rather,
it is a subcategory of CSR. The broader concept of CSR remains relevant
since it includes a generalized descriptive analysis independent of the use of
metrics. It follows that disclosure considerations apply not only to the ESG
metrics-driven discussions that investors crave, but also to more generalized
descriptions of a company’s commitment to social values. CSR disclosures
would include, for example, a company’s approach to balancing the pursuit
of social values with its profit-driven mission. Accordingly, this explores
various aspects of corporate social responsibility and also identifies
disclosure issues relating to metrics-driven ESG.
The securities laws already have some disclosure requirements relating
to the individual aspects of ESG – environmental issues, social concerns, and
corporate governance. These existing disclosures focus on discrete
situations rather than addressing ESG generally. For example, with respect
to its shareholder proposal rule,24 the SEC has recognized that investors have
a legitimate interest in a company’s environmental impact.25 With respect to
social issues generally, the SEC has recognized that investors have a
legitimate interest in the company’s approach to social issues such as animal
24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8).
25. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc., 2019 SEC No-Action Letter, 2019 LEXIS 267 (Apr. 3,
2019) (stating management could not rely on Rule 14a-8(i)(5) to exclude a shareholder
proposal requesting that the company issue an annual report on the environmental and social
impacts of food waste generated from the company’s operations given the significant impact
that food waste has on societal risk from climate change and hunger); Chevron Corp., 2019
SEC No-Action Letter, 2019 LEXIS 155 (Mar. 15, 2019) (stating management could not rely
on Rule 14a-8(i)(7) to exclude a proposal requesting that the board issue an annual report to
shareholders on plastic pollution); Arch Coal, Inc., 2013 SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 LEXIS
223 (Jan. 31, 2013) (stating management could not rely on Rule 14a-8(i)(5) to exclude a
shareholder proposal requesting a report on the conditions resulting from the company’s
mountaintop removal operations that could lead to environmental and public health harms and
on feasible, effective measures to mitigate those harms; the staff noted that the proposal did
not agree that the proposal was not “otherwise significantly related” to the company’s
business); Dean Foods Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005WL 723855 (Mar. 25, 2005) (stating
management could not exclude a shareholder proposal requesting that Dean disclose its social,
environmental and economic performance by issuing annual sustainability reports).
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cruelty,26 diversity and inclusion,27 public health concerns,28 and other similar
areas of concern. These shareholder proposal examples are not reflective of
a mandatory disclosure requirement, but rather arise in the context of a
company’s response to shareholder initiatives with respect to management’s
proxy statement.
With respect to the governance aspect of ESG, the SEC already has
some specific disclosure mandates. For example, the SEC requires
disclosure of a publicly held company’s internal controls to monitor the
company’s operations,29 as well as disclosures regarding the company’s audit
committee.30 In addition, some environmental disclosures are required if
they relate directly to the company’s bottom line. One such example is the
need to address potential material Superfund31 and other potential
environmental liabilities.32 The foregoing examples of the SEC’s response
26. See, e.g., Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985)
(granting preliminary injunction against exclusion of shareholder proposal that the directors
form a committee to consider termination of distribution of pate de foie gras until a more
humane production method is developed).
27. See, e.g.,The Coca–Cola Co., SECNo-Action Letter, 2003WL 122319 (Jan. 7, 2003)
(stating management could not rely on either 14a–8(i)(3) nor 14a–8(i)(7) to exclude a
shareholder proposal requesting that the board of directors amend the company’s “corporate,
diversity, and equal employment policies to exclude reference to sexual orientation” and
“cease support of homosexual lifestyle and other deviant lifestyle behaviors opposed by the
majority of people.”).
28. See, e.g., The Coca Cola Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2019 LEXIS 58 (Feb. 21, 2019)
(stating management could not rely on Rule 14a-8(i)(7) or Rule 14a-8(i)(10) to exclude a
shareholder proposal requesting that the board issue a report on sugar and public health, with
support from a group of independent and nationally recognized scientists and scholars
providing critical feedback on the Company’s sugar products marketed to consumers,
especially those Coke products targeted to children and young consumers. The Proposal also
specifies that the report should include an assessment of risks to the Company’s finances and
reputation associated with changing scientific understanding of the role of sugar in disease
causation).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2). See, e.g., In re Robert S. Harrison, Exchange Act Release
No. 34–22466 (Sept. 26, 1985) (holding an issuer must institute internal accounting controls
to monitor the activities of its chief financial officer and prepare financial statements); see
also In re Tonka Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34–22448 (Sept. 24, 1985) (explaining
that Tonka “failed to devise andmaintain a system of internal accounting controls with respect
to corporate investments sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions were
executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorizations . . . ”).
30. See, e.g., Regulation S-K item 407, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (disclosures relating to a
company’s audit committee).
31. Corporations with environmental hazards on their real property may be subject to
liability for the costs of cleanup. See Env’t Prot. AgencyWhat is Superfund?, https://www.e
pa.gov/superfund/what-superfund [https://perma.cc/YK82-8U87].
32. See, e.g., SEC Interpretation: Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures (May 18,
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to some specific environmental social and governance issues do not extend
to more generalized disclosures regarding the company’s approach to these
issues generally. ESG-related disclosures are promoted as a way to fill this
gap.
It is notable that the existing mandatory disclosures mentioned above
relate primarily to the company’s operations and performance in terms of
profitability. For example, the internal controls and audit committee
requirements are geared toward corporate performance. These disclosure
requirements are not framed in terms of the broader question of social
responsibility.33 The only departure from linking disclosures to profitability
and performance does not arise in the context of mandatory disclosure, but
rather in the SEC’s responses to shareholder proposals for inclusion in
management’s proxy statement. Recognizing and encouraging enhanced
ESG disclosures would expand that focus.
This article urges the SEC to supplement these existing disclosure
requirements by mandating, or at least encouraging, more holistic ESG and
CSR disclosures. Many large companies already engage in voluntary ESG
disclosures.34 After discussing ESG and the securities laws’ disclosure
philosophy, the discussion that follows explores the various ways that this
could be accomplished and standardized under the securities laws.
1989), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-6835.htm [https://perma.cc/9JZS-89V5]
(discussing need to consider environmental liabilities in MD&A disclosures); see also James
G. Archer, Thomas M. McMahon & Maureen M. Crough, SEC Reporting of Environmental
Liabilities, 20 ENV’T. L. REP. 10105 (1990) (discussing, among other things, a company’s
need to disclose environmental liabilities).
33. These disclosures are consistent with the now outdated view of Milton Friedman that
the only social responsibility of a corporation is to make money for its shareholders. c.f.
Friedman supra note 1.
34. See, e.g., Jon Lukomnik, State of Integrated and Sustainability Reporting 2018,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 3, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/20
18/12/03/state-of-integrated-and-sustainability-reporting-2018/ [https://perma.cc/FM8K-4Z
DD] (“Sustainability reporting for large public companies around the world has become the
norm. Si2’s research this year (2018) found that 78 percent of the S&P 500 issued a
sustainability report for the most recent reporting period, most with environmental and social
performance metrics. The rate of sustainability reporting for the world’s largest companies is
even higher, with some figures noting as high as 93 percent. This is a starkly different picture
from the 1980s, when a handful of companies in vulnerable sectors—extractives and
chemicals, which had to respond to public backlash against environmental mishaps—were
the only ones to publish environmental reports with limited performance metrics. It was not
until the 1990s that sustainability reports as we know them today started gaining traction, after
the concept of “triple bottom line”—environmental, social and economic—corporate
performance was introduced and became popular.”) (footnote omitted) (summarizing Sol
Kwon, State of Sustainability and Integrated Reporting 2018, https://www.weinberg.udel.ed
u/IIRCiResearchDocuments/2018/11/2018-SP-500-Integrated-Reporting-FINAL-November
-2018-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ8Z-H6KZ].
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III. THECURRENT STATE OF ESGDISCLOSURES AND THE LACK OF
STANDARDIZATION
The absence of mandatory ESG disclosures has resulted in a voluntary
regime. Increased pressure from socially responsible institutional investors
has spurred many companies to make ESG-related and other social
responsibility disclosures.35 Voluntary ESG disclosures are quite common
today, but there is a lack of standardization across the board.36 There are
ESG data providers that prepare and disseminate ESG data and company
ratings to investors and investment analysts.37 For example, as of 2016, there
were more than one hundred organizations that provided ESG data.38 There
35. See, e.g., Paul Rissman & Diana Kearney, Rise of the Shadow ESG Regulators:
Investment Advisers, Sustainability Accounting, and Their Effects on Corporate Social
Responsibility, 49 ENV’T. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10155, 10155 (2019) (suggesting that
institutional investors’ ever-increasing focus on social responsibility will “push CSR to the
forefront of corporate consciousness, [and] is the finalization of a set of material disclosure
standards for sustainability topics”). See also, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, Risk Related
Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647 (2016)
(discussing the potential positive impact of institutional investors’ monitoring companies’
ESG metrics).
36. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-530 Report to
Honorable Mark Warner U.S. Senate, Public Companies Disclosures of Environmental,
Social, and Governance Factors and Options to Enhance Them (2020), https://www.gao.gov
/assets/710/707949.pdf [https://perma.cc/L62Y-6ZYR] (noting the lack of standardization as
a significant problem); Press Release, Sen. Mark Warner, Warner on New GAO Report
Highlighting Importance of Requiring Corporate Disclosure of Environmental, Social, and
Governance Issues (July 6, 2020), https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/7/
warner-on-new-gao-report-highlighting-importance-of-requiring-corporate-disclosure-of-en
vironmental-social-and-governance-issues [https://perma.cc/73RM-TGPR] (“The GAO
report makes the need for comparable disclosure clear: even basic metrics like carbon dioxide
emissions can be reported differently from company to company. It is time that the SEC
grapple directly with the metrics that GRI and SASB have developed – which researchers
have consistently found to be material to company performance – and issue guidance on
quantifiable and comparable disclosures.”); Florian Berg, Julian F. Koelbel & Roberto
Rigobon, Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings (May 18, 2020), https://pap
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3438533 [https://perma.cc/MNN5-RBVK]
(discussing the key variations that result in problematic lack of standardization). In a positive
development, the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board and the Global Reporting
Initiative announced a joint initiative to provide a greater degree of standardization in their
ESG reporting methodologies. See Michael Cohn, SASB Teams with GRI on Sustainability
Reporting, ACCOUNTINGTODAY (July 13, 2020), https://www.accountingtoday.com/news/sas
b-teams-with-gri-on-sustainability-reporting [https://perma.cc/RXA7-AJTU] (announcing
the joint initiative).
37. See generally State of ESG Data and Metrics, 8 J. ENV. INVESTING no. 1 (2017)
(evaluating ESG data).
38. See, e.g., Who are the ESG Rating Agencies?, SUSTAINABLE PERSPECTIVE FOR THE
MAINSTREAM INVESTOR, SUSTAINABLE INSIGHTCAPITALMANAGEMENT (Feb. 2016), https://w
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are a large number of independent firms that use their own format and
methodology for ESG data. A consequence of varying formats and
methodologies is a lack of standardization. Similarly, publicly held
companies have taken various approaches in framing their ESG
disclosures,39 which adds to the lack of standardization. Thus, there is no
uniformity in the way that companies and third-party providers present ESG-
related information. The absence of standardization in ESGmetrics has been
said to result in confusing inconsistencies in ESG data.40 Even ESG
advocates recognize and bemoan the lack of industry-wide standards and the
need to create more consistency.41
It is worth noting that not everyone is a fan of across-the-board
standardization. For example, SEC Chair Clayton expressed his view that
different industries and companies have their own context that can make
across-the-board standardization inappropriate.42 It is certainly possible that
ww.sicm.com/docs/who-rates.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX7H-6YGZ] (describing ESG data
providers). It was estimated that “the six leading providers of ESG data cover in excess of
2,000 securities.” Id. at 2.
39. Advisory subcommittee report infra note 118 at 5–6 (some footnotes omitted).
40. Sakis Kotsantonis &George Serafeim, Four Things No OneWill Tell You About ESG
Data, 31 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN 50 (2019) (discussing inconsistency in ESG data). See also,
e.g., ESG’s Unsustainable Irony: A Lack of Transparency, INVESTMENT NEWS (Feb. 18,
2020), https://www.investmentnews.com/esgs-unsustainable-irony-a-lack-of-transparency-1
88374 [https://perma.cc/4N7K-TAW2] (calling for consistency in ESG data); see also Huw
Van Steenis, Defective Data is a Big Problem for Sustainable Investing, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/c742edfa-30be-328e-8bd2-a7f8870171e4 [https:
//perma.cc/G63L-L9EL] (identifying the need for better ESG data).
41. See, e.g., ESG Investing is Growing, but Lack of Standards is Hampering Investor
Adoption Rate, RESPONSIBLE-INVESTORS (May 24, 2019), https://responsible-investors.com/2
019/05/24/esg-investing-is-growing/ [https://perma.cc/AW5K-PES4] (bemoaning the lack of
standardization); see also Brad Foster & David Tabit, As Demand for ESG Investing Grows
so Too Does the Need for High-Quality Data, PENSIONS& INVESTMENTS (Apr. 19, 2019) http
s://www.pionline.com/article/20190419/ONLINE/190419817/commentary-as-demand-for-
esg-investing-grows-so-too-does-the-need-for-high-quality-data [https://perma.cc/96FP-VJ
W6] (recognizing the need for better ESG data). See also, e.g., Jill M. D’Aquilla, The Current
State of Sustainability Reporting—A Work in Progress, CPA J., (July 2018) https://www.cpaj
ournal.com/2018/07/30/the-current-state-of-sustainability-reporting/ [https://perma.cc/AT4
E-XFJ5] (indicating 60% of companies believe their sustainability related disclosures help
investors make comparisons between companies, but 92% of investors do not agree).
42. Jay Clayton, Remarks to the Economic Club of New York (Nov. 19, 2020) https://w
ww.sec.gov/news/speech/clayton-economic-club-ny-2020-11-19 [https://perma.cc/KQ6P-Y
GMN] (“It has often been noted that this process can be more efficient if disclosure is
standardized or uniform. However, standardization can be difficult across industries, and in
particular, with respect to forward-looking information, it can be vexing as it requires uniform
assumptions about the future. Personally, I am of the view that any standardization should be
approached on a sector-by-sector basis, starting with the sectors that are already using metrics
to track and assess climate-related risks.”).
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as the ESG data industry evolves, even without regulatory impetus, there will
be some self-imposed standardization that will make it easier for investors
to digest and evaluate the information.43 However, as discussed throughout
this article, the SEC should help jumpstart this process in order to accelerate
ESG standardization.
As recently explained by an SEC investor advisory subcommittee,
publicly held companies have taken varied approaches to ESG-related
disclosures:
Some publish lengthy stand-alone reports; others include ESG-
related information in their annual reports or SEC ‘34 Act filings;
some provide information according to third party standards such
as [Global Reporting Initiative] GRI, the Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board (SASB), the Task Force on Climate-
Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), etc. Others do not report
directly but, as noted above, reply to third party surveys requested
by ESG data providers, which in turn provide ESG information or
scoring systems to investors. Some Issuers engage in a
combination of all of these and other methods. The point is that,
despite a great deal of information being in the mix, there is a lack
of consistent, comparable, material information in the marketplace
and everyone is frustrated – Issuers, investors, and regulators.44
This absence of standardization was a major impetus for the advisory
subcommittee’s recommendation that the SECmandate ESG disclosures and
adopt rules to help promote more meaningful ESG disclosures.45
43. See, e.g., State Street Global Advisors, The ESG Data Challenge (Mar. 2019), https:
//www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2019/03/esg-data-chal
lenge.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA77-W2VJ].
44. Advisory subcommittee report infra note 118 at 5 (footnotes referencing https://www
.globalreporting.org/, https://www.sasb.org/, and https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/ omitted). See
also, e.g., Recommendations of the SEC Advisory Committee Relating to ESG Disclosures
(May 21, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/esg-disclo
sure.pdf [https://perma.cc/KRP4-5G46]. See also, e.g., Ruth Jebe, The Convergence of
Financial and ESG Materiality: Taking Sustainability Mainstream, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 645
(2020) (promoting SASB’s approach to sustainability as compared to the SEC’s “hand-off”
approach).
45. See, e.g., Blaine Townsend, The Case for Standardized Audited ESG Reporting,
ACCOUNTING TODAY (May 15, 2019), https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/the-ca
se-for-standardized-audited-esg-reporting [https://perma.cc/2386-5WLR] (calling for ESG
regulation and standardization) and the discussion infra in the text accompanying notes 118-
137.
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IV. OVERVIEW OF THE SECURITIES LAWS’ DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
The basic premise of the federal securities laws is to focus on
disclosure, not on directly impacting corporate conduct, rights, and
obligations, which is the province of state corporate law. Also, unlike the
state securities laws that predated federal law, which still exist today, the
federal securities laws focus on disclosure and do not impose a merit analysis
on securities. The securities laws thus embrace Louis Brandeis’ observation
that sunlight is the best disinfectant.46 The underlying premise of federal
securities law was to eliminate the “let that buyer beware” from securities
transactions47 and to provide transparency and full disclosure to allow
investors to make informed investment decisions. The required disclosures
are thus created to provide information that is deemed essential to investors
with adequate information upon which they can base their investment
decisions.48 Although the securities laws are focused on disclosure rather
than corporate conduct, disclosure necessarily has a salutary impact on
corporate conduct, lest corporations be forced to make disclosures that prove
unpopular with investors.
The increased focus on CSR, ESG, and sustainability raises questions
as to whether the securities laws should respond at all, and if so, how the
46. LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’SMONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
92 (1914) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman”). Professor Alasdair Roberts traces this sentiment to an earlier analysis in James
Brice, The American Commonwealth (1888):
Public opinion is a sort of atmosphere, fresh, keen, and full of sunlight, like that
of the American cities, and this sunlight kills many of those noxious germs which
are hatched where politicians congregate. That which, varying a once famous
phrase, we may call the genius of universal publicity, has some disagreeable
results, but the wholesome ones are greater and more numerous. Selfishness,
injustice, cruelty, tricks, and jobs of all sorts shun the light; to expose them is to
defeat them. No serious evils, no rankling sore in the body politic, can remain
long concealed, and when disclosed, it is half destroyed.
Alasdair Roberts, Where Brandeis got “sunlight is the best disinfectant”, (Mar. 1, 2015)
https://aroberts.us/2015/03/01/where-brandeis-got-sunlight-is-the-best-disinfectant/ [https://
perma.cc/TA6B-XLH8].
47. The securities laws have been described as a shift from the paradigm of caveat emptor
to one of caveat vendor: “[t]his proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor the further
doctrine, ‘let the seller also beware.’ It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller.
It should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public
confidence.” Message to Congress from President Franklin Roosevelt (March 29, 1933), as
quoted in H.R. REP. 73–85 (1933).
48. See the discussion of materiality infra text accompanying notes 67-105.
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response should look. With respect to ESG specifically, SEC Chair Clayton
observed:
Disclosure is at the heart of our country’s and the SEC’s approach
to both capital formation and secondary liquidity. As stewards of
this powerful, far reaching, dynamic and ever evolving system, a
key responsibility of the SEC is to ensure that the mix of
information companies provide to investors facilitates well-
informed decision making. The concepts of materiality,
comparability, flexibility, efficiency and responsibility (i.e.,
liability) are the linchpins of our approach. This group knows these
concepts well, knows that they are interrelated, and knows that,
when we consider changes to our approach to disclosure, these
concepts should be front of mind. Turning to “ESG”, a broad term,
we are increasingly seeing disclosure of ESG information by
issuers in the marketplace and requests for ESG information by
investors. I am also aware of efforts by third parties to develop
disclosure frameworks relating to ESG topics as well as calls by
some market participants for issuers to follow third-party
disclosure frameworks relating to ESG topics.49
Before analyzing the specifics of ESG disclosures, the discussion that
follows provides a brief overview of the securities laws’ disclosure
requirements and the periodic disclosure system.
The first federal securities law, the Securities Act of 1933,50 focuses on
public offerings of securities. Among other things, the 1933 Act requires
that companies that offer securities to the public must do so pursuant to a
registration statement that provides investors with full disclosure of material
facts regarding the company and the securities being offered.51 The 1933
Act does not apply to transactions or securities beyond the public offering
context. Once a public offering is over, the 1933 Act ceases to apply.
The Securities Exchange Act of 193452 imposes periodic reporting
requirements on publicly held companies once they become public. Section
12(a) requires SEC registration of companies with securities listed on a
49. Chairman Jay Clayton, Meeting of the Investor Advisory Committee (Dec. 13, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-remarks-investor-advisory-committee-m
eeting-121318 [https://perma.cc/9W4A-XS5T].
50. Act of May 27, 1933, c. 38, Title I, §1, 48 Stat. 74, codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et
seq.
51. See generally 1, 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION chs. 2–3, 9 (West Academic Publishing, 7th ed. 2016).
52. Act of June 6, 1934, c. 404, Title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 881, codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et
seq.
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national securities exchange.53 Section 12, in turn, imposes periodic
reporting requirements. With respect to the over-the counter markets,
publicly held companies not listed on a national exchange, section 12(g)
requires registration of companies with more than $10 million in assets and
2,000 shareholders of record or imposes a lower shareholder threshold for
companies with 500 record shareholders who are not accredited investors.54
Companies registered under the Securities Exchange Act’s periodic
reporting requirements are not the only ones required to file periodic reports.
The 1934 Act’s periodic reporting requirements are triggered for companies
which, even if they are not registered under section 12, issue securities under
a registration statement required by the Securities Act of 1933.55
The basic reports for publicly held companies that must be filed with
the SEC are: (a) quarterly reports on Form 10-Q,56 (b) an annual report on
Form 10-K,57 and (c) an interim report on Form 8-K58 for any month in which
certain specified events occur. Additional disclosures are required for
registered companies when the management solicits proxies or consents for
shareholder votes.59 The details of the line-item disclosures required in these
reports are found in SEC Regulation S-K60 and in Regulation S-X for
financial information.61 The Securities Exchange Act’s periodic reporting
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a)(2).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1). Unaccredited investors include financial institutions, many
investment funds, officers and directors of the company, and individuals with a net worth of
at least $1,000,000, excluding the value of one’s primary residence, or have income of at least
$200,000 each year for the last two years (or $300,000 combined income if married) and have
the expectation to make the same amount going forward. E.g., Securities Act § 2(a)(15), 15
U.S.C. § 77(a)(15); SEC Rules 215, 501(a), 17 C.F.R. 230.215, 501(a).
In addition to the periodic reporting requirements, section 12 registration subjects the
company to the other obligations, including the 1934 Act’s requirements, proxy regulation
(15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) and applicable SEC rules), tender offer (15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d),(e), 78n(d),
(e), (f) and applicable SEC rules), as well as reporting of insider transactions in the company
shares (15 U.S.C. § 78p and applicable SEC rules).
55. Section 15(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d), provides that companies that have
issued securities under a 1933 Act registration statement with more than 300 record holders
of such securities are subject to 1934 Act periodic reporting requirements.
56. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a, https://www.sec.gov/files/form10-q.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9
UD-DCLK].
57. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310, https://www.sec.gov/files/form10-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4M
F-QDQH] (stating that the annual report is to be filed instead of the fourth quarter quarterly
report).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308, https://www.sec.gov/files/form8-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Y92-
5MD8].
59. Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (proxy statement disclosures); annual report
to shareholders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (annual report to shareholders).
60. 17 C.F.R. part 239.
61. 17 C.F.R. part 210.
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requirements contain various items where ESG-related disclosures could be
included.62
Thus, there are various current reporting requirements that potentially
implicate ESG-related disclosures. For example, discussion of employment
issues and environmental impact can arise in an SEC filing as part of a
company’s description of its business.63 These disclosure items could
involve employment practices that raise social responsibility, environmental
impact, and sustainability issues. Furthermore, companies are asked to
evaluate risk factors in their disclosures.64 Management discussion and
analysis disclosures also can involve ESG disclosures.65 These are among
some of the existing disclosure requirements that could involve discussion
of ESG-related topics.66
The discussion that follows focuses on the securities laws’ materiality
requirement. This is followed by various disclosures that could implicate
ESG-related disclosures.
V. MATERIALITY – THE LYNCHPIN OFDISCLOSURE
A. Overview of Materiality and its Applicability to ESG
The materiality requirement is derived from common law fraud and is
the lynchpin of the securities laws’ disclosure requirements. In a common
law action for fraud or deceit, a successful plaintiff must prove there was a
material misstatement or omission of fact.67 The common law materiality
62. Additional disclosures could be required for public offerings under the registration
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77f, 77j; 1933 Act Forms
S-1 and S-3, 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.11, 239.13, https://www.sec.gov/files/forms-1.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/PBQ3-656S], https://www.sec.gov/files/forms-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NZU-74F].
63. Regulation S-K item 101 addresses disclosures relating to a company’s business. 17
C.F.R. § 239.101.
64. See, e.g.,Regulation S-K item 503(c), 17 C.F.R. § 239.503(c). See also, e.g.,Virginia
Harper Ho, The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 4 J. CORP. L. 647 (2016)
(advocating that more attention be paid to ESG risks).
65. Regulation S-K item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 239.303. See, e.g., Commission Guidance on
Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations,
Release Nos. 33-10751; 34-88094 (Jan. 30, 2020) (discussing metrics generally) and the
discussion infra in the text accompanying notes 157-163
66. See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, Disclosure Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure &
ESG Reporting Reform from the Regulation S-K Concept Release, 65 VILL. L. REV. 67 (2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3452457 [https://perma.cc/B9J9-3Y2R]
(challenging objections to ESG disclosure reform).
67. See, e.g., Muller-Paisner v. TIAA, 289 Fed. Appx. 461 (2d Cir. 2008) (dismissing
securities and common law fraud claims for failure to allege a material misstatement but
upholding claims based on breach of fiduciary duty).
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requirement is incorporated into the securities laws by statute,68 case law,69
and by SEC rule.70 In other words, “[f]or the securities lawyer ‘materiality’
is the name of the game.”71 Materiality depends on whether the plaintiff can
establish “a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider [the misstatement or omission] important.”72 The test of materiality
is thus focused on the question of whether a reasonable investor would have
considered the matter significant.73 It is not necessary to conclude that the
investor would have acted differently.74 As such, materiality can include a
wide variety of factors a reasonable investor would consider significant.
Materiality is not established merely because a shareholder might have
found the information to be of interest.75 Whether something is material is
based on an objective analysis based on the reasonable investor. The fact
that someone subjectively views a statement as significant is not sufficient
to establish materiality.76 In order for a statement to be materially
misleading, there must be a significant element of inaccuracy or obfuscation.
Whether a fact is material depends not upon the literal truth of statements,
but upon the ability of reasonable investors to become accurately informed
68. E.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (prohibiting material
misstatements and omissions in connection with the offer or sale of securities); Securities
Exchange Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (imposing liability for material misstatements and
omissions in filings with the SEC).
69. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011) (requiring materiality for
a Rule 10b-5 action); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (requiring materiality for
a Rule 10b-5 action); TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (applying
the materiality standard in the context of the federal proxy rules).
70. E.g., Securities Exchange Act Rule 3b-6(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(d) (defining
materiality); Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (prohibitingmaterial
misstatements and omissions in connection with purchases and sales of securities).
71. RICHARDW. JENNINGS&HAROLDMARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1023 (5th ed. 1982).
72. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Accord Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 101 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining it was
material for general partner to fail to disclose that it was repurchasing interest of limited
partner who was suing general partner for breach of fiduciary duty).
74. See, e.g., Folger Adam Co. v. PMI Industries, Inc., 938 F.2d 1529 (2d Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 983 (1991) (explaining that it could not be said as a matter of law that
omitted income projections were not material).
75. See, e.g., Milton v. Van Dorn Co., 961 F.2d 965, 969 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[T]he mere
fact that an investor might find information interesting or desirable is not sufficient to satisfy
the materiality requirement.”).
76. See United States v. Litvak, 889 F.3d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 2018) (explaining that evidence
of the counterparty’s representative’s “idiosyncratic and erroneous belief” of the statement’s
significance was prejudicial and not relevant to the objective test for materiality).
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by the statement based on the total mix of publicly available information.77
This is sometimes referred to as the mosaic misrepresentation thesis.78
Determination of materiality is highly factual and therefore can be
unpredictable.79 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the concept
of materiality cannot be distilled into a bright-line test.80 Due to the fact
that the factual determinations can be highly nuanced, materiality
determinations are rarely appropriate for summary judgment or
judgment on the pleadings.81 In fact, it has repeatedly been held that the
concept of materiality cannot be distilled into a bright-line test.82 Thus, the
determination is to be made on a fact specific case-by-case basis as to
whether the statements in question were of the type that a reasonable investor
would consider significant in making an investment decision. As one SEC
Commissioner observed, materiality does not provide a very good
benchmark for determining what sustainability-related issues may be
material as applied to standards of disclosure.83
77. McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 900 F.2d 576, 579 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1249 (1991) (“Some statements, although literally accurate, can
become, through their context andmanner ofpresentation, devices whichmislead investors.”).
78. See, e.g., Allan Horwich, The Mosaic Theory of Materiality—Does the Illusion Have
a Future?, 43 SEC. REG. L.J. 129 (2015) (discussing materiality in the context of insider
trading and the mosaic theory).
79. See 3 HAZEN supra note 51 §§ 12:60-12:77 (discussing materiality in detail).
80. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011) (rejecting defendant’s
contention that the absence of statistical significance necessarily rendered immaterial a study
on the adverse consequences of a drug); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (rejecting
a bright line price and structure as a threshold for materiality of merger negotiations).
81. E.g., City of Monroe Employees Retirement System v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d
651 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing the highly factual nature of materiality); Folger Adam Co. v.
PMI Industries, Inc., 938 F.2d 1529 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 983 (1991)
(explaining that it could not be said as a matter of law that omitted income projections were
not material); SEC v. Conrad, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (discussing factual issues
as to whether some statements were materially misleading; others were materially
misleading); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Johnston, 310 F. Supp. 3d 265 (D.
Mass. 2018) (discussing how fact issues regarding materiality precluded summary judgment).
See also, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455
(2013) (explaining how, if sufficiently alleged, materiality need not be determined at the time
of class certification but should await summary judgment or trial on the merits).
82. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011) (rejecting defendant’s
contention that the absence of statistical significance necessarily rendered immaterial a study
on the adverse consequences of a drug); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (rejecting
a bright line price and structure as a threshold for materiality of merger negotiations).
83. Statement of Commissioner Allison Herren Lee, “Modernizing” Regulation S-K:
Ignoring the Elephant in the Room (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statem
ent/lee-mda-2020-01-30 [https://perma.cc/U9UZ-826J] (“It is also clear that the broad,
principles-based “materiality” standard has not produced sufficient disclosure to ensure that
investors are getting the information they need—that is, disclosures that are consistent,
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In applying the materiality requirement, courts have invoked a number
of doctrines that can exacerbate the challenges in determining whether
particular information or statements are objectively material. This is
especially true with respect to so-called “soft information,” which includes
predictions, opinions, and the like.84 Two questions frequently arise with
regard to the issues surrounding soft information. The first question
addresses the extent to which there is an affirmative obligation to make a
prediction or other disclosures of soft information. The second question is
whether an incorrect opinion, projection, or prediction is actionable.85 These
same questions arise with respect to the substance of ESG disclosures.
When applying a materiality yardstick to opinions, the courts have
recognized that puffery or sales talk does not rise to the level of materiality
required to be actionable in court.86 Statements that are merely aspirational
rather than factual representations are not material.87 The same is true for
statements that are too vague to be considered material.88 Thus, generalized
statements about a company’s commitment to social responsibility and good
corporate governance are easily susceptible to not being material.89
reliable, and comparable.”).
84. See 3 HAZEN supra note 51 § 12:69 (discussing soft information generally).
85. See 3 HAZEN supra note 51 § 12:69 at 718.
86. See, e.g., Carvelli v. Ocwen Financial Corp., 934 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding
that statements regarding progress it was making toward state regulatory compliance were
puffery; statements expressing only belief and expectations were opinions and thus not
material); Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 894 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that
brief laudatory statements were merely statements of general enthusiasm and were not
materially misleading); Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 1994 WL 396187 (W.D. Mo. 1994)
(holding that projection that company was looking forward to growth in earnings per share
were “vague, soft, puffing statements” that could not have been reasonably relied upon as a
guarantee). Cf. Aisha Saad & Diane Strauss, The New “Reasonable Investor” and Changing
Frontiers of Materiality: Increasing Investor Reliance on ESG Disclosures and Implications
for Securities Regulation, 17 BERK. BUS. L.J. at 397 (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pap
ers.cfm?abstract_id=3590809 [https://perma.cc/S82D-FCVA] (arguing in favor of a reliance-
based approach to materiality for voluntary ESG disclosures that would narrow the
availability of a puffery defense).
87. See, e.g., Department Store Union Local 338 Retirement Fund v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 845 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2017).
88. See, e.g., Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that statement that
company was recession-resistant was too vague to be material); Galati v. Commerce Bancorp,
Inc., 2005 WL 3797764 at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2005), affirmed 220 Fed. Appx. 97 (3d Cir.
2007) (claims of illegal conduct were too speculative to be material).
89. See, e.g., Department Store Union Local 338 Retirement Fund v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 845 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that officer’s alleged sexual misconduct and
alleged violation of ethics code were not material; the court noted that the company’s
statements promoting the company’s code of ethics “were transparently aspirational” and “did
not reasonably suggest that there would be no violations of [the code] by the CEO or anyone
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However, to the extent that CSR discussion in SEC filings goes beyond mere
generalizations and aspirations, materiality thresholds may be implicated.90
Similarly, linking sustainability to profitability can render the otherwise
aspirational statements material.91
The extension of CSR generally to ESG metrics may move the needle
towards or past materiality92 to the extent that the disclosures appear to be
more factual than aspirational. The more detail in the CSR or ESG
discussion, the more likely it is that a reasonable investor would perceive the
statements as factual representations rather than aspirational generalizations.
Even without specific factual representations, a detailed discussion of CSR
and ESG factors could be viewed as implying the existence of underlying
conduct consistent with the metrics. To the extent that there is underlying
conduct that is inconsistent with the stated principles, investors may have a
better chance of establishing material omissions with respect to that conduct.
There is considerable support for the proposition that ESG disclosures
can be material under the current regime of voluntary disclosure. There is
also support in the investment community to encourage the SEC to explicitly
recognize the materiality of ESG issues.93 For example, the SEC has
else”); Ulbricht v. Ternium S.A., 2020 WL 5517313 at * 9 ( E.D.N.Y. 2020) (holding code of
conduct prohibition against bribery was aspirational and did not imply that company’s officers
did not engage in bribery); In re Braskem S.A. Securities Litigation, 246 F. Supp. 3d 731,
754–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding code of ethics was aspirational and did not imply that it was
complied with). See also, e.g., James v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 65 Misc.3d 1233(A) (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2020) (table, text on Westlaw) (holding company providing conceptual information about
managing climate change risks did not make material misstatements).
90. See, e.g., In re Vale S.A. Securities Litigation, 2020 WL 2610979 (E.D.N.Y. 2020)
(noting that while general aspirations of sustainability were aspirational, the materiality
threshold was satisfied by company’s specific recommendations regarding steps being taken).
91. See, e.g., id. (quoting In re BHP Billiton Ltd. Sec. Litig., 276 F. Supp. 3d 65, 79
(S.D.N.Y. 2017)) (“While certain statements, viewed in isolation, may be mere puffery, when
the statements are made repeatedly in an effort to reassure the investing public about matters
particularly important to the company and investors, those statements may become material
to investors.”).
92. See the discussion of qualitative versus quantitative disclosures infra in the text
accompanying notes 97-105.
93. See, e.g., Petition for SEC Rulemaking Regarding Climate Change Disclosures (June
10, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2020/petn4-763.pdf [https://perma.cc/MDN9
-5QMH] (calling for to requiring companies to identify the specific locations of their
significant assets, so that investors, analysts and financial markets can do a better job assessing
the physical risks companies face related to climate change); Petition for SEC Rulemaking
Regarding ESG Disclosures (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-
730.pdf [https://perma.cc/DS48-A3TX] (suggesting ESG disclosures are material); Ruth
Jebe, The Convergence of Financial and ESG Materiality: Taking Sustainability Mainstream,
56 AM. BUS. L.J. 645 (2019) (criticizing the SEC’s failure to act on sustainability and arguing
in favor of Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) standards as a basis for
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observed that “a disclosure is considered material if it reflects the significant
economic, environmental, and social impacts of the organization of the
stakeholders, and the capacity of the stakeholders to influence the economic,
environmental and social impacts or activities of the organization.”94 The
SEC’s analysis of materiality in the ESG context reinforces the amorphous
fact-based determination of what is material and what is not. Thus, the
existing SEC guidance fails to provide specifically referenced instructions
on how to make materiality determinations.
Even without the needed standardization, at least with the benefit of
hindsight, there have been situations in which ESG disclosures would have
been material. For example, as one accounting observer commented:
Governance risk is financially material (see: corporate fraud).
Social risk is financially material (see: #MeToo movement).
Environmental risk is financially material (see: Valdez oil spill).
We can’t afford another 50 years for ESG reporting to become
standardized and on par with financial reporting and auditing.
Hopefully, the pain that catalyzes that eventual shift won’t leave a
lasting scar.95
Even members of the corporate community recognize that ESG
disclosures can be material in the context of the current voluntary disclosure
system.96 As discussed below, materiality determinations may be aided by
classifications of qualitative and quantitative materiality.
B. Qualitative and Quantitative Materiality
The evolution of the CSR movement to include ESG has materiality-
based implications. General discussions of CSR are qualitative in nature.
On the other hand, ESG is premised on use of metrics. The use of metrics
determining materiality of ESG issues); Hannah V. Vizcarra, The Reasonable Investor and
Climate Related Information: Changing Expectations for Financial Disclosures, 50 ENV. L.
REP. 10106 (2020) (supporting the materiality of climate change disclosures).
94. SEC Memorandum Circular No. 4, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines for Publicly
Held Companies, at 16 (2019), http://www.sec.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2019MC
No4.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SZX-YYPC].
95. Blaine Townsend, The Case for Standardized Audited ESG Reporting, ACCOUNTING
TODAY (May 15, 2019), https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/the-case-for-standardized
-audited-esg-reporting [https://perma.cc/94VH-KMNV].
96. See, e.g., David Katz & Laura McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update: EESG and
the Covid-19 Crisis, HARV. L.F. ON CORP. GOV. AND FIN. REG. (May 31, 2020), https://corpg
ov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/31/corporate-governance-update-eesg-and-the-covid-19-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/UND4-MNZ6] (“[I]t is now clear that certain EESG issues potentially have
a material impact on short-term financial returns as well as long-term enterprise value.”).
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provides more of a quantitative feel to the disclosures. Since metrics-based
discussion is reasonably perceived to be more quantitative, it can be viewed
as more likely to appear to be factual rather than having the generalized
aspirational tone that can be attached to qualitative CSR discussion.
However, as noted above, there are instances in which qualitative disclosures
will be material.
The SEC and the courts have embraced qualitative materiality for many
years.97 For example, with respect to governance issues, the SEC has stated
that management integrity is “always a material factor.”98 There are other
instances in which small quantitative misstatements can still be material if
97. See, e.g., SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.Wis.1978)
(holding that nondisclosure of kickback scheme was material regardless of de minimis
quantitative significance because inter alia, it reflected on the lack of management integrity);
In re Petrobras Securities Litigation, 116 F.3d 368, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Strougo v.
Barclays PLC, 105 F. Supp. 3d 330, 349 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2015)) (“The errors in Petrobras’
financial statements were directly related to its concealment of the unlawful bribery scheme,
revelation of which would ‘call into question the integrity of the company as a whole.’”); In
the Matter of Franchard Corp., 423 S.E.C. 163 (1964) (holding CEO’s cash withdrawals
should be judged not by the quantitative amount but rather the extent to which they reflect
negatively on management integrity which rendered the disclosures materially misleading).
See also, e.g., Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650, 655 (2d Cir.
1979) (“[F]actual information concerning the honesty of directors in their dealings with the
corporation . . . . would be material to shareholders.”); In re Grupo Televisa Securities
Litigation, 368 F. Supp. 3d 711 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (holding that sufficiently pleading
materiality of failure to disclose company’s participation in bribery scheme; also sufficiently
pleading company’s statements about its code of ethics were materially misleading); In re
Unisys Corp. Securities Litigation, 2000 WL 136795 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that
misstatements relating to less than 1% of income could be material) (relying on In re
Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90 F.3d 696, 714–715 (3d Cir. 1996)); United States v.
Hatfield, 724 F. Supp. 2d 321, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“It is well-settled that information
impugning management’s integrity is material to shareholders.”); Berman v. Gerber Products
Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1321–23 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (holding that in making a tender offer
facts relating to integrity of ender offeror’s management are material). But cf.Roeder v. Alpha
Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that there was no duty to disclose
bribe since plaintiff could not point to any statement that was materially misleading without
the disclosure); DoubleLine Capital LP v. Odebrecht Fin., Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 3d 393, 441–42
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that in the absence of an express statement, a corporation has no
affirmative duty to disclose “uncharged, unadjudicated wrongdoing;” similarly, the company
corporation need not disclose illegal internal policies, or violations of the corporation’s
internal codes of conduct and legal policies. A duty to disclose uncharged criminal conduct
may arise when failure to disclose such conduct would make other statements materially
misleading); Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, 164 F. Supp. 3d 568, 581–82
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding there was no duty to disclose uncharged wrongdoing but upholding
complaint for other misrepresentations).
98. In the Matter of Franchard Corp., 423 S.E.C. 163, 172 (1964).
See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, Executive Private Misconduct, 88GEO. WASH. L. REV. 327, 361–70
(2020) (lamenting the gaps in disclosure requirements regarding executive misconduct).
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qualitatively material.99
Concerns about qualitative materiality can be especially prominent
when dealing with financial disclosures. For example, the SEC in its Staff
Accounting Bulletin (SAB) 99, takes the position that even relatively small
accounting discrepancies can be material.100 The SEC additionally requires
both qualitative and quantitative disclosures relating to market risk.101 While
helpful in many instances,102 qualitative disclosures have been criticized as
too murky to support a meaningful materiality analysis.103 For example, a
former SECCommissioner commented that “[any]one who has tried to apply
SABNo. 99 is left with little certainty.”104 These concerns about a qualitative
approach to financial disclosures are merely reflective of the amorphous
nature of materiality determinations as discussed above. The materiality
99. See, e.g., Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding
that materiality is qualitative not solely quantitative and thus the percentage of revenue was
not dispositive of materiality; instead, the court looks to the total mix of information).
100. See Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99—Materiality, Release No. SAB 99, 64 Fed.
Reg. 451250–01 (Aug. 12, 1999), which, among other things, sets forth non-exclusive
examples of qualitative factors that might cause a small quantitative misstatement to be
considered material. Those factors include: whether the misstatement masks a change in
earnings or other corporate trends, whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts’
consensus expectations for the business, and whether the misstatement changes a loss into
income or changes income into a loss.
101. Regulation S-K item 305, 17 C.F.R. § 229.305 (stating that qualitative and
quantitative disclosures about market risk are required to the extent they are material).
102. See, e.g., ECA, Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Tr. of Chicago v. JP Morgan Chase
Co., 553 F.3d 187, 205 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that qualitative factors are intended to allow for
a finding of materiality if the quantitative size of the misstatement is small, but the effect of
the misstatement is large), relying on Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2d
Cir. 2000) (“[W]e have consistently rejected a formulaic approach to assessing the materiality
of an alleged misrepresentation.”); Litwin v. Blackstone Group, L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 717 (2d
Cir. 2011) (“[A] court must consider both quantitative and qualitative factors in assessing an
item’s materiality and that consideration should be undertaken in an integrative manner.”);
S.E.C. v. Patel, 2008 WL 781914, at *10–11 (D.N.H. Mar. 24, 2008) (recognizing qualitative
in addition to a quantitative approach to materiality but finding no material misstatements or
omissions).
103. See, e.g., Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the Materiality Standard in the
Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 62 BUS. LAW. 317, 329 (2007) (“The courts are
left with little guidance as to how to weigh quantitative indicia of materiality, while unable to
escape the importance of doing so.”); Glenn F. Miller, Comment, Staff Accounting Bulletin
No. 99: Another Ill–Advised Foray Into the Murky World of Qualitative Materiality, 95 NW.
U.L. REV. 361 (2000). But see, e.g., Caroline A. Antonacci, SAB 99: Combating Earnings
Management with a Qualitative Standard of Materiality, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 75 (2001)
(noting that SAB No. 99 combats earnings management).
104. Paul S. Atkins, SEC Commissioner, Remarks to the “SEC Speaks in 2008” Program
of the Practicing Law Institute (Feb. 8, 2008), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech
/2008/spch020808psa.htm [https://perma.cc/5FW8-LMWS].
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conundrum reinforces the difficulty of effectively clarifying guidelines for
an effective ESG disclosure regime relying solely on existing law. The
current regime fosters undesirable uncertainty in outcomes depending solely
on determining materiality. Rather than merely applying existing materiality
concepts, it would be preferable for the SEC to provide specifically tailored
line-item disclosure requirements, a safe harbor rule, more helpful SEC
disclosure guidance, or a combination of some or all of those.
The distinction between qualitative and quantitative materiality has two
implications for ESG disclosures. In the first instance, the use of metrics
may support the impression that the statements are factual rather than merely
aspirational, which could increase the likelihood of categorizing the
statements as material. Secondly, even to the extent that the use of metrics
is quantitative, insignificant deviations can still be material, since as pointed
out above, even small financial impact can be material under a qualitative
analysis.
As noted above, qualitative and quantitative distinctions can impact
materiality determinations. The foregoing discussion reveals that in
evaluating materiality as it applies to CSR and ESG more generally, the
focus must include both qualitative and quantitative factors.
The discussion above highlights the unpredictable nature of materiality
determinations. Securities lawyers and companies need to strive for
precision and certainty in drafting disclosure items generally. The
amorphous nature of materiality means that it is not sufficiently precise to
simply rely on an across-the-board requirement that CSR and ESG
disclosures must be made when they are material.105 This requirement is
nothing more than a truism and does not provide helpful guidance for
evaluating disclosures. Thus, an SEC policy that does no more than point to
materiality as the sole determinant of when companies should make CSR and
ESG disclosures is problematic. Materiality as the sole determinant would
be likely to cause confusion and significantly further the current inconsistent
state of these disclosures. The discussion that follows explores the various
approaches the SEC could take to improve the current state of CSR and ESG
disclosures.
VI. OVERVIEW OF POTENTIALAPPROACHES TO ENCOURAGING OR
REQUIRINGCSR AND ESGDISCLOSURES
The SEC has a checkered history in terms of receptiveness to
105. As discussed in the next section, an SEC advisory committee included this in its
recommendations. See infra notes 118-137 and accompanying text.
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incorporating social responsibility into the SEC disclosure system.106 In
recent years, the SEC has become increasingly interested in CSR and ESG
disclosures in particular. For example, the current regulation consists of
voluntary disclosures with some SEC guidance on how companies should
frame their ESG disclosures.107 The SEC’s recognition of CSR and ESG’s
significance is not limited to disclosures a company may voluntarily decide
to make. For example, the ability of shareholders to require management to
include shareholder proposals in management’s proxy statements108 often
reflects shareholder interest in CSR and ESG.109 In recent years, the SEC
staff has become increasingly more receptive to shareholder proposals
relating to sustainability,110 climate change,111 and ESG.112
Even if a clear determination can be made that certain CSR or ESG
issues are material, there is no affirmative duty to disclose absent an SEC
106. See Hazen supra note 4, at 855–903 (discussing various SEC encounters with social
responsibility issues).
107. See, e.g., Commission Guidance on Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Release Nos. 33-10751; 34-88094 (Jan. 30,
2020) (including guidance for discussing sustainability and metrics in MD&A disclosures);
SEC Memorandum Circular No. 4, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines for Publicly Held
Companies (2019), http://www.sec.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2019MCNo4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6BQ-EY9G] (including guidance on materiality and suggestions for
referencing ESG metrics).
108. SEC Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14-8 addresses the circumstances under which
management must include a shareholder-initiated proposal in the proxy statement used by
management to solicit proxies.
109. See generally 3 HAZEN supra note 51 §§ 10:43-10:47, 10:55.
110. See, e.g., Host Hotels & Resorts, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter 2018 LEXIS 117 (Feb.
28, 2018) (stating that management could not rely on Rule 14a-8(i)(3) or 14a-8(i)(6) to
exclude a proposal requesting that the company issue an annual sustainability report with due
diligence about operations at the company’s properties, including the impact on investors of
hotel operators environmental, human rights, and labor practices).
111. See, e.g., Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, SEC No-Action Letter 2019 LEXIS 260
(Apr. 3, 2019) (noting that management could not rely on Rule 14a-8(5) or 14a-8(7) to exclude
a proposal requesting that the Company to issue an annual report on the environmental and
social impacts of food waste generated from the Company’s operations given the significant
impact that food waste has on societal risk from climate change and hunger); Ross Stores,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter 2019 LEXIS 192 (Mar. 29, 2019) (stating that management could
not rely on Rule 14a-8(i)(7) to exclude a proposal which requested that the board prepare a
climate change report to shareholders).
112. Rite Aid Corp., SEC No-Action Letter 2018 LEXIS 253 (Apr. 23, 2018) (stating that
management could not rely on Rule 14a-8(i)(7) or 14a-8(i) (10) to exclude a proposal which
requested that the company prepare a sustainability report describing the company’s ESG
risks and opportunities, including customer and worker safety, privacy and security, and
environmental management). As noted earlier, there was recent success when Chevron’s
shareholders voted in favor of a climate change proposal. SeeDavidWethe&Kevin Crowley,
supra note 11.
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form or Schedule that imposes a line item disclosure obligation. For
example, Rule 10b-5(b) prohibits omission of material facts only when the
omitted facts are “necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”113
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the securities laws do not require
disclosure simply because a fact is material.114 Thus, there is no duty of
disclosure based on materiality alone. In other words, absent a line item
disclosure requirement or impermissible insider trading,115 “silence is
golden.”116 Accordingly, a trigger (such as a voluntary ESG discussion or an
existing line-item disclosure requirement) is necessary for a rule to the effect
that it is materially misleading to omit CSR or ESG information. The
discussion that follows explores the various approaches the SEC could take
to improve CSR and ESG disclosures.
VI. VOLUNTARY ORMANDATORYDISCLOSURE?
Whether to make ESG disclosures is a strategic decision that each
company can make. As noted above, the SEC does not currently mandate
CSR or ESG disclosures. Although there have been some efforts in Congress
to increase ESG disclosure,117 there is no indication to date that they have
any traction. This article focuses on potential SEC initiatives. Of course, a
willing Congress could take the initiative as well.
An SEC investor advisory subcommittee recently issued a series of
113. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2011).
114. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n. 17 and accompanying text (1988).
115. Rule 10b-5 insider trading violations are based on the so-called disclose or abstain
from trading rule. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 passim (1997) (applying
the disclose or abstain rule).
116. As stated by Delaware Chancellor Leo Strine:
[t]he maxim silence is golden is not simply a goad to good manners at the local
movie theater, it is good advice in many realms of life. For example, those are
truly words of wisdom when you are not under a duty to speak and someone asks
you a question that potentially touches upon information that you would rather
not divulge.
Corp. Prop. Assoc. 14 Inc. v. CHR Holding Corp., No. 3231-VCS, 2008 WL 963048 at *1
(Del. Ch. Ct. 2008). See also, e.g., Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir.
1987) (holding there was no duty to disclose bribe since plaintiff could not point to insider
trading or any statement that was materially misleading without the disclosure).
117. Shareholder Protection Act of 2019, S. 1630, 116th Cong. (2019-2020) (requiring
public companies to make public disclosure of political contributions); ESG Disclosure
Simplification Act of 2019, H.R. 4329, 116th Cong. (2019-2020) (requiring more robust ESG
disclosures).
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recommendations regarding standardizing ESG-related disclosures.118 The
recommendations include mandating ESG disclosures by publicly held
companies. The subcommittee recommends principles-based, rather than
rules-based disclosure requirements. The report by the subcommittee
identified the lack of standardization that currently exists with respect to
ESG disclosures.119 This lack of standardization creates investor
confusion.120 The report included five observations and recommendations.
First, investors need reliable ESG disclosures to enable informed investment
and voting decisions.121 Second, publicly held companies should provide
material ESG disclosures.122 Third, SEC-mandated standardized ESG
disclosures would level the playing field between large, medium, and smaller
public companies.123 Fourth, the report posits that standardized ESG
disclosures would encourage the flow of capital into the U.S. markets.124
Fifth, the report urges that the U.S. “take the lead” with respect to material
ESG disclosures.125 More specifically, the recommendations included
mandating ESG disclosures by publicly held companies by invoking
principles-based, rather than rule-based, disclosure requirements. The report
of the subcommittee identified the lack of standardization that currently
exists with respect to ESG disclosures126 and acknowledged that its absence
creates investor confusion.127
Some off-shore regulators have imposed mandatory ESG disclosures.128
118. Recommendation from the Investor-as-Owner Subcommittee of the SEC Investor
Advisory Committee Relating to ESG Disclosure (May 14, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/spotl
ight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/recommendation-of-the-investor-as-owner-subcom
mittee-on-esg-disclosure.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AES-T8WS] [hereinafter “Advisory
subcommittee report”].
119. Advisory subcommittee report supra note 118 at 4.
120. Advisory subcommittee report supra note 118 at 4.
121. Advisory subcommittee report supra note 118 at 7.
122. Advisory subcommittee report supra note 118 at 8.
123. Advisory subcommittee report supra note 118 at 8.
124. Advisory subcommittee report supra note 118at 9.
125. Advisory subcommittee report supra note 118 at 9,
126. Advisory subcommittee report supra note 118 at 4.
127. Advisory subcommittee report supra note 118 at 4.
128. For example, there is a 2014 European Union (EU) Directive on the Disclosure of
Non-Financial and Diversity Information requiring certain companies to provide specific
sustainability disclosures. Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of Oct. 22, 2014, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 330/1) 1, 5 (EU). As explained by Professor Fisch:
The Directive requires non-financial reporting by 1) large companies, 2) “public-
interest” entities, and 3) companies with more than 500 employees per year, on
average. CSR EUR. & GRI, Member State Implementation of Directive
2014/95/EU, at 8 (2017), https://www.accountancyeurope.eu/wp-content/upload
s/1711-NFRpublication-GRI-CSR-Europe.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BMD-C3CG]
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In 2020, the European Union adopted mandatory ESG disclosures.129 This
means the U.S. has to play considerable catch-up to become the leader that
the advisory subcommittee report recommends.130 The report contains some
guidance as to what steps should be taken to enhance ESG disclosures in the
U.S. One recommendation is the adoption of a mandatory ESG disclosure
regime. In recommending mandatory ESG disclosures, the report wisely
recommends a principles-based approach:
[T]he SEC should take the lead on this issue by establishing a
principles-based framework that will provide the Issuer-specific
material, decision-useful, information that investors (both
(explaining these criteria).
Because the Directive is implemented at the country level, different countries
have adopted varying criteria with respect to its application. For example, the
Danish regulation redefines “large company” to include, inter alia, companies
with an average of 250 employees. Innovative Implementation of EU Directive
on Non-Financial Reporting, GRI (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.globalreporting.or
g/information/news-and-press-center/Pages/EU-Directive-on-Non-Financial-Re
porting.aspx [https://perma.cc/QQ72-U539]. In contrast, the Greek legislation
imposes a duty to report on companies of all sizes. Id.
Fisch infra note 139 at 928 n. 22. See also, e.g., Anna Maleva-Otto & Joshua Wright, New
ESG Disclosure Obligations, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ONCORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/24/new-esg-disclosure-obligations/ [https://perma.
cc/6J9U-Y7WN] (discussing EU regulation on Sustainability-Related Disclosures -
Regulation (EU) 2019/2088); Barbara Novick, Deborah Winshel, Michelle Edkins, Kevin G.
Chavers, Zachary Olesiuk & John McKinley, Exploring ESG: A Practitioner’s Perspective,
BLACKROCK (2016), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-
exploring-esg-a-practitioners-perspective-june-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SE2-X9NQ]
(comparing various countries responses to ESG disclosures).
129. See, e.g., David M. Silk, David A. Katz & Sebastian V. Niles, U.K. and EU
Regulators Move Ahead on ESG Disclosures and Benchmarks, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 26, 2020) (describing the new EU ESG disclosure regime); EU
Parliament Adopts Sustainability Taxonomy Regulation to Fight Greenwashing,NAT. L. REV.
(July 12, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/eu-parliament-adopts-sustainability-
taxonomy-regulation-to-fight-greenwashing [https://perma.cc/94PS-VCXE] (“The
Regulation establishes six environmental objectives as the basis of the taxonomy. They are
(i) climate change mitigation, (ii) climate change adaptation, (iii) sustainable use and
protection of water and marine resources, (iv) transition to a circular economy, including
waste prevention and increasing the uptake of secondary raw materials, (v) pollution
prevention and control and (vi) protection and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystems.”).
130. See, e.g., Preston Brewer, analysis: Tracking the SEC’s Evolving Approach to ESG
Disclosures, BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov. 4, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-l
aw-analysis/analysis-tracking-secs-evolving-approach-to-esg-disclosures [https://perma.cc/P
A32-PDB7] (“Europe is ahead of the U.S. in responsible investing. And it’s far ahead of the
U.S. in mandating disclosure of ESG risks and opportunities by financial market participants
and financial advisers. The EU’s ESG disclosure regime works to harmonize disclosures
across both sectors and financial market operators. It does this by requiring ESG risks and
opportunities be disclosed in a consistent, standardized way that enables comparison.”).
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institutional and retail) require to make investment and voting
decisions. This disclosure should be based upon the same
information that companies use to make their own business
decisions. If the SEC does not take the lead, it is highly likely that
other jurisdictions will impose standards in the next few years that
US Issuers will be bound to follow, either directly or indirectly,
due to the global nature of the flow of investment into the US
markets.131
At least one other SEC official agrees with the principles-based
approach, observing that “the very breadth of these issues illustrates the
importance of a flexible disclosure regime designed to elicit material,
decision-useful information on a company-specific basis.”132 As discussed
more fully below,133 a principles-based approach to required disclosures
would be preferable to a rules-based mandate. Of course, with a principles-
based approach, there is always the potential that overly general principles
would perpetuate some of the uncertainty that exists under the current
voluntary disclosure regime.
The subcommittee’s report was not unanimous, with four members of
the subcommittee voting against the recommendations.134 One dissenter
observed: “I don’t think many people would benefit from what would
probably be a massive amount of boiler plate legalese or a master manual
with lots of boxes to be checked.”135 Similarly, at least two SEC
Commissioners questioned the wisdom of enhancing ESG disclosures.136
131. Advisory subcommittee report supra note 118 at 9.
132. William Hinman, Applying a Principles-Based Approach to Disclosing Complex,
Uncertain, and Evolving Risks (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/hinman-ap
plying-principles-based-approach-disclosure-031519 [https://perma.cc/VPQ5-MRET].
133. See infra text accompanying notes 138-156.
134. Support for the committee report was split 14 to 4. See Jacob Rund, SEC Urged by




136. Elad L. Roisman, Keynote Speech at the Society for Corporate Governance National
Conference (July 7, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/roisman-keynote-society-corpo
rate-governance-national-conference-2020 [https://perma.cc/X2DX-YTUH] (suggesting a
principles-based materiality approach is preferable to mandating ESG disclosures); Hester
Peirce, Commissioner Peirce Speaks to SEC Advisory Committee, CLSBLUE SKYBLOG (May
26, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/05/26/commissioner-peirce-speaks-to-s
ec-investor-advisory-committee/ [https://perma.cc/7AN3-7ZCG] (“If this committee is able
to focus our attention on discrete pieces of information for which disclosure mandates are
necessary, perhaps a substantive discussion could follow. A more general call to develop a
new ESG reporting regime—without a clear explanation of why the past fifty years of
discussion on the topic has not crystallized into a universally applicable set of material ESG
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Notwithstanding these criticisms, the principle of encouraging and
standardizing ESG disclosures is consistent with what investors want. The
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) subsequently issued a report
reviewing and analyzing the strong sentiments from many sectors. The
GAO report called for the improved ESG disclosures and some of the
recommendations that the SEC establish a standardized framework for ESG
disclosures.137
This article suggests that the SEC should go much further than it has to
date in taking steps to encourage and improve, if not mandate, ESG
disclosures. Alternatively, the SEC could stop short of imposing a mandate
that companies make specified ESG disclosures. For example, the SEC
could provide improved guidance for voluntary ESG disclosures that would,
in turn, encourage some degree of standardization. More specific guidelines
in terms of SEC guidance on ESG disclosures could go a long way towards
providing investors with better and more meaningful ESG disclosures. At
the very least, the SEC should adopt a safe harbor rule to encourage
disclosures while limiting the potential for liability resulting from those
disclosures.
VII. EVALUATING THEALTERNATIVES – SHOULDCSR AND ESG
DISCLOSURES BEREQUIRED OR SIMPLY ENCOURAGED?
As noted earlier, an SEC advisory subcommittee recommends
mandating material ESG disclosures and the creation of a principles-based
approach in order to provide guidelines which will help bring about more
standardization of ESG disclosures.138 There has been significant scholarly
support for the imposition of mandatory ESG disclosures.139 In 2016, the
SEC solicited comments on whether to require ESG disclosures140 but to date
items, but now is the magic moment—may not be as helpful. Otherwise, let’s keep using our
tried and true disclosure framework, which is rooted in materiality and is flexible enough to
accommodate a wide range of issuers, each with its unique and ever-evolving set of risks.”);
see also, e.g., Hester Peirce, Scarlet Letters: Remarks Before the American Enterprise
Institute (June18, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peirce-061819 [https://pe
rma.cc/AVF2-S4EG] (questioning the value of ESG).
137. GAO Report to Honorable Mark Warner U.S. Senate, Public Companies Disclosures
of Environmental, Social, and Governance Factors and Options to Enhance Them (July 2,
2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/707949.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3MZ-3DRH].
138. Advisory subcommittee report supra note 118
139. See generally Jill E. Fisch,Making Sustainability Disclosures Sustainable, 107 GEO.
L.J. 923 (2019) (proposing that the SEC adopt principles-based sustainability disclosures).
140. See, e.g., Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K: Concept
Release, 81 Fed. Reg. 23916, 23919 (SEC Apr. 22, 2016) (referencing objections to enhanced
ESG disclosure).
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has not moved in that direction.
Another alternative suggested by some is to focus on ESG funds and
their disclosure obligations rather than focusing on the publicly held
companies that they invest in.141 Specifically, one SECCommissioner would
like to see increased disclosure by ESG funds explaining how ESG factors
are evaluated and weighed in making investment decisions.142 This would
provide investors in funds with more detailed descriptions of the funds’
investment policies. Such enhanced disclosure by the funds becomes even
more meaningful if the SEC improves the ESG disclosures made by the
companies the ESG funds are considering as investments. Mutual funds are
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940.143 Among its many
requirements, the Investment Company Act requires a mutual fund “to
identify its principal investment strategies, including the types of securities
in which it invests principally.”144 Thus, for example, ESG focused funds
are required to explain their investment strategies in explaining who the fund
141. Roisman supra note 136.
142. Roisman supra note 136. Also, the Department of Labor recently adopted a rule to
go even further with respect to ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) regulated
pension plans by requiring plan managers to focus on financial performance rather than ESG
considerations. Employee Benefits Security Administration, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846-01 (Dept.
of Labor Nov. 13, 2020). ERISA plans managers are required to evaluate “investments and
investment courses of action based solely on pecuniary factors that have a material effect on
the return and risk of an investment based on appropriate investment horizons and the plan’s
articulated funding and investment objectives . . . .” Employee Benefits Security
Administration, 85 Fed. Reg. 39113 (proposed Jun. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. ch.
18 § 1001). ERISA regulates many employer-sponsored retirement plans. The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461). Compare U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-1239, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS:
Retirement Plan Investing (May 2020); Ted Knutson, GAO Urges Removal of Roadblocks to
ESG Investing in Retirement Plans, FORBES (May 22, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/te
dknutson/2018/05/22/esg-investing-roadblocks-by-retirement-plans-should-be-removed-urg
es-congressional-report/#4578f8ac517a [https://perma.cc/UDT9-QHXV] (calling on the
Department of Labor to go in the other direction and ease barriers to pension plan ESG
investing). BlackRock maintains that its focus on sustainability is investment-motivated. See
Sandra Boss, BlackRock, Inc., Our Approach to Sustainability, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (July 20, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/20/our-approach-to-
sustainability/#more-131469 [https://perma.cc/Y7U3-BHNT] (“This past January,
BlackRock wrote to clients about how we are making sustainability central to the way we
invest, manage risk, and execute our stewardship responsibilities. This commitment is based
on our conviction that climate risk is investment risk and that sustainability-integrated
portfolios, and climate-integrated portfolios in particular, can produce better long-term, risk-
adjusted returns.”).
143. Act of Aug. 22, 1940, 54 Stat. 789, (codified as 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a–1 - 80a–52).
144. Investment Company Institute, SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2001WL 1530143 (Dec.
4, 2001).
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focuses on – ESG or sustainability – in selecting investments.145 Further,
there is literature supporting ESG investments as consistent with fund
managers’ fiduciary duties.146 Although increased disclosure by funds is
worthy of consideration, detailed discussion of the mutual fund disclosure
requirements is beyond the scope of this article.
Support for enhanced ESG disclosures is not universal and more
generalized opposition to mandatory disclosure as a general matter is not
new147 and continues today.148 Thus, mandatory ESG reporting by publicly
held companies has its detractors and critics.149 For example, it has been
suggested that voluntary disclosures are sufficient in light of shareholder
145. See, e.g., Managed Portfolio Series, SEC Staff Comment letter, 2020 WL 2866862
(May 05, 2020) (discussing sufficiency of fund’s disclosures relating to its ESG investing
strategies); Allianz Funds Multi-Strategy Trust, SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2018 WL
1731582 (Apr. 3, 2018) (discussing use of “sustainability” in fund’s name). SEC Rule 35d-
1, 17 C.F.R. 270.35d-1, governs fund names and the extent to which a fund’s name may
implicate a requirement that at least 80% of the fund’s investments must reflect the description
in the fund’s name. Companies have differed as to whether the 80% requirement applies to
funds with SEG in the name and the SEC has solicited comments on whether to address this
in SEC rulemaking or interpretations. See Request for Comments on Fund Names (“The staff
has observed that some funds appear to treat terms such as ‘ESG’ as an investment strategy
(to which the Names Rule does not apply) and accordingly do not impose an 80 percent
investment policy, while others appear to treat ‘ESG’ as a type of investment (which is subject
to the Names Rule”). Request for Comments on Fund Names, Investment Company Act
Release No. IC-33809, 2020 WL 1088604; SEC File No. S7-04-20 (Mar. 2, 2020).
146. See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG
Integration, 90 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 731, 732 (2019) (“[T]he available data explain why a
prudent investor should consider ESG information.”). Cf. Zachary Barker, Note, Socially
Accountable Investing: ApplyingGartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management’s Fiduciary
Standard to Socially Responsible Investment Funds, 53 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 283
(2020) (suggesting that fiduciary standards that govern fund managers’ performance should
be extended beyond financial performance to social accountability).
147. See, e.g., FRANKH. EASTERBROOK&DANIEL P. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 256 (Harvard University Press 1991) (noting disclosure is more
efficiently regulated by market forces than by regulators); Roberta Romano, Empowering
Investors: AMarket Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2373–81 (1998)
(arguing market incentives rather than the SEC should set the standards for disclosure by
publicly held companies); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV.
1453, 1465–70 (1997) (advocating a competitive regulatory approach to securities
regulation).
148. AndrewA. Schwartz,Mandatory Disclosure in PrimaryMarkets 2019, UTAHL.REV.
1069 (2019) (questioning the wisdom of mandatory disclosure regimes).
149. See, e.g., Hester Peirce, Statement on Proposed Amendments to Modernize and
Enhance Financial Disclosures,HARV. L. SCH. FORUMONCORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 1, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/01/statement-by-commissioner-peirce-on-proposed
-amendments-to-modernize-and-enhance-financial-disclosures/ [https://perma.cc/U9FV-ZA
WQ] (“We ought not step outside our lane and take on the role of environmental regulator or
social engineer.”).
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activism and its impact.150 However, there does not appear to be any traction
for generally eliminating the securities laws’ basic premise of requiring full
disclosure. Accordingly, the analysis in this article is limited to ESG-related
issues within the context of the current mandatory disclosure framework for
publicly held companies generally.
A. Specific Line-Item Requirements
As noted above, a report to the SEC recommended that investors would
benefit through mandated material ESG disclosure. A decision to mandate
ESG disclosures would raise questions as to how to implement the disclosure
requirements. One possible approach would be mandating disclosures
through specifically drafted disclosures listing the items required to be
disclosed. This approach is generally referred to as line-item disclosure.151
The challenge in creating such a requirement would be specifying the details
of what must be disclosed. In contrast, a principles-based approach focusing
on materiality alone without more specific line-item guidance would not
provide a suitable threshold. This is because, as pointed out above,152
materiality is highly factual and does not provide a bright line test. Thus,
materiality as the sole benchmark would not provide sufficient guidance in
identifying the scope of required ESG disclosures. One possible approach
would be to follow the same pattern as the disclosure requirements for
management discussion and analysis153 (MD&A) as well as compensation
discussion and analysis154 (CD&A). Both the MD&A and CD&A disclosure
requirements are principles-based rather than specific rules regarding what
150. See, e.g., Corporate Sustainability Reporting: Past, Present, Future, U.S. CHAMBER
OF COM. FOUND. (Nov. 2018), https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/
Corporate%20Sustainability%20Reporting%20Past%20Present%20Future.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/45YW-PXQU], at 8 (summarizing the Chamber of Commerce’s opinion on self-
reporting).
151. See, e.g., Form 10-K, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGECOMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov
/files/form10-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4MF-QDQH] (last visited Feb. 13, 2021) (form for
annual report, referencing line-item disclosure requirements). For example, the Biden
administration recently recommended that the SEC adopt mandatory disclosures regarding
greenhouse emissions. SeeKelly Lunney, Proposed SECClimate DisclosureMandate Draws
Republican’s Ire. BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 19, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/enviro
nment-and-energy/proposed-sec-climate-disclosure-mandate-draws-republicans-ire [https://p
erma.cc/P5U2-UZYU].
152. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
153. Reg. S–K Item 303(a)(3)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2020). See the SEC’s
explanation in Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition, Securities Act
Release No. 33–6835 (SECMay 18, 1989).
154. Regulation S-K item 402(b), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b) (2020).
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must be disclosed and how it should be disclosed. Another advantage to the
discussion and analysis approach is that following the courts’ approach to
the MD&A disclosures, a violation of those requirements would not
automatically translate into securities fraud that could form the basis of an
action for damages.155 Thus, it would not expose companies to undue
litigation risk.156
B. Requiring Disclosure Through Discussion and Analysis
As pointed out above, a discussion and analysis approach can provide
a principles-based disclosure mandate. The discussion that follows provides
an overview of MD&A and CD&A and then explains how that approach
could be adapted to CSR and ESG disclosures.
1. Overview of MD&A
The MD&A requirement is found in Item 303 of Regulation S–K. In
the course of its Management’s Discussion and Analysis of financial
condition and report of operations, management is directed to analyze
operations.157 This analysis includes disclosure of trends and uncertainties
that are likely to have a material effect on the company. Among other things,
Item 303 requires management to discuss “any known trends or uncertainties
that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material
favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from
155. See, e.g., Carvelli v. Ocwen Financial Corp., 934 F.3d 1307, 1331 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“Item 303 imposes a more sweeping disclosure obligation than Rule 10b-5, such that a
violation of the former does not ipso facto indicate a violation of the latter.”); Stratte-McClure
v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2015) (identifying that although a violation of
Item 303 does not automatically rise to the level of a Rule 10b-5 violation, “a violation of
Item 303’s disclosure requirements can only sustain a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b–5 if the allegedly omitted information [also] satisfies Basic’s test for materiality.”).
156. See, e.g., Connor Kuratek Joseph A. Hall & Betty M. Huber, Legal Liability for ESG
Disclosures, HARV. L. SCH. F. ONCORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 3, 2020), https://corpgov.law.ha
rvard.edu/2020/08/03/legal-liability-for-esg-disclosures/#more-131560 [https://perma.cc/79
VL-VK5E] (“The threat of potential litigation should not dissuade companies from disclosing
sustainability frameworks and metrics. Not only are companies facing investor pressure to
disclose ESGmetrics, but such disclosure may also incentivize companies to improve internal
risk management policies, internal and external decisional-making capabilities and may
increase legal and protection when there is a duty to disclose. Moreover, as ESG investing
becomes increasingly popular, it is important for companies to be aware that robust ESG
reporting, which in turn may lead to stronger ESG ratings, can be useful in attracting potential
investors.”) (footnotes omitted).
157. Reg. S–K Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2020). For a more complete analysis of
the MD&A requirement, see 2, 3 HAZEN supra note 51, §§ 9:50, 12:70.
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continuing operations.”158 The MD&A obligation extends to trends and
uncertainties that are “known” and thus, it is not enough that they were
simply “knowable.”159 MD&A is a mandatory disclosure item but does not
define the scope of liability for material misstatements and omissions.
Violation of Item 303’s disclosure mandate does not necessarily violate SEC
Rule 10b-5.160 As a result, Item 303’s disclosure mandate is significantly
broader than the disclosure mandate imposed by Rule 10b-5 without
necessarily creating civil liability for violations of the MD&Amandate. The
MD&A disclosures focus both on current operations and on plans for future
operations. The MD&A disclosures are designed to centralize a narrative
discussion of the company’s financial condition within one portion of the
applicable disclosure document.161 TheMD&Adisclosures are also designed
to give investors an informed basis for assessing a company’s future
prospects.162 Although the SEC has indicated that MD&A could have
158. Reg. S–K Item 303(a)(3)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2020). See the SEC’s
explanation in Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Result of
Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 6835, 1989 WL 1092885 (SECMay 18, 1989).
159. See, e.g., J & R Marketing, SEP v. General Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 391-92 (6th
Cir. 2008) (identifying failure to establish that information was in fact known as opposed to
knowable).
160. See In re NVIDIA Corp. Securities Litigation, 768 F.3d 1046, 1055 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“Management’s duty to disclose under Item 303 is much broader than what is required under
the standard pronounced in Basic.”); City of Omaha Police and Fire Retirement System v.
Evoqua Water Technologies, Corp., 2020 WL 1529371 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding failure to
plead MD&A violations since item 303 does not require disclosure of internal business
strategies); relying on Steamfitters’ Industrial Pension Fund v. Endo International PLC, 771
F. App’x. 494, 498 (2d Cir. 2019) (determining Item 303 did not require disclosure of an
alleged plan to restructure an acquired company’s business model by, among other things,
laying off executives); Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 105 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“[T]he SEC has never gone so far as to require a company to announce its internal business
strategies.”).
161. See Management Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 33, 6835,
Exchange Act Release No. 34, 26831, Investment Company Act Release No. IC -16961, 43
S.E.C. Docket 1330, 1989 WL 1092885 (May 18, 1989) (“The MD&A requirements are
intended to provide, in one section of a filing, material historical and prospective textual
disclosure enabling investors and other users to assess the financial condition and results of
operations of the registrant, with particular emphasis on the registrant’s prospects for the
future.”) (footnotes omitted).
162. See Concept Release on Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Operations, 52 Fed. Reg 13715, Securities Act Release No. 33-6711, Exchange
Act Release No. 34, 24356, 38 S.E.C. Docket 145, 1987 WL 847497 (Apr. 17, 1987) (“The
Commission has long recognized the need for a narrative explanation of the financial
statements, because a numerical presentation and brief accompanying footnotes alone may be
insufficient for an investor to judge the quality of earnings and the likelihood that past
performance is indicative of future performance. MD & A is intended to give the investor an
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implications for ESG disclosures, it did not provide meaningful specific
guidance beyond that general observation.163
2. Overview of CD&A
Regulation S-K’s CD&A requires discussion of the methods used by
companies in setting management compensation.164 As a result of changes
adopted in 2006, the executive compensation disclosure requirements now
have a component analogous to the SEC’s MD&A disclosures regarding
operations.165 CD&A is designed to provide a narrative description and
analysis of a company’s compensation for named executive officers. In
particular, the CD&A disclosure requires answers to the following questions:
• What are the objectives of the company’s compensation
programs?
• What is the compensation program designed to reward?
• What is each element of compensation?
• Why does the company choose to pay each element?
• How does the company determine the amount (and, where
applicable, the formula) for each element?
• How do each element and the company’s decisions regarding
that element fit into the company’s overall compensation
objectives and affect decisions regarding other elements?166
As is the case with MD&A, the CD&A disclosures provide a good
analogy for requiring discussion and analysis regarding CSR and ESG
disclosures. For example, as Professor Jill Fisch astutely points out, a
sustainability discussion and analysis (SD&A) regime would mandate public
opportunity to look at the company through the eyes of management by providing both a short
and long-term analysis of the business of the company. The Item asks management to discuss
the dynamics of the business and to analyze the financials.”).
163. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities
Act Release No. 33-9106, (Feb. 2, 2010).
164. Regulation S-K item 402(b), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b). See Executive Compensation
And Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 33, 8732, Exchange Act Release
No. 34, 54302, Investment Company Act No. IC - 27444, 2006WL 2335558 (Aug. 11, 2006).
165. As explained by the SEC:
[T]he new Compensation Discussion and Analysis calls for a discussion and
analysis of the material factors underlying compensation policies and decisions
reflected in the data presented in the tables. This overview addresses in one place
these factors with respect to both the separate elements of executive
compensation and executive compensation as a whole.
Id. at *5.
166. Id. at *13.
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companies address sustainability in their disclosures while still remaining
within the confines of a principles-based requirement.167 Such a principles-
based requirement is far preferable to a more rigid rules-based requirement
for ESG disclosures generally.
3. Proposals for CSR and ESG D&A
As noted above, Professor Fisch has proposed a principles-based
sustainability discussion analysis requirement (SD&A).168 Specifically, she
concludes that “the relationship between issuer sustainability practices and
risk management, business plans, and economic vulnerability warrant
incorporating sustainability information into SEC-mandated financial
reporting” and creating a requirement for sustainability discussion and
analysis.169 This wise proposal would go a long way towards improving CSR
and ESG disclosures and would be a welcome innovation.
A slight variation of Professor Fisch’s SD&A proposal would be if the
SEC were to go beyond the environmental component of ESG and further
require discussion and analysis of other social issues and corporate
governance. For example, the SEC could require a company to discuss its
approach to CSR and ESG to the extent to which CSR and ESG impact
corporate decision-making, and the extent to which these policies have had
or are likely to have a material impact on company operations. A CSR or
ESG discussion and analysis requirement could also mandate disclosure of
company guidelines for CSR and ESG issues, and the extent to which the
company and its management are in compliance with those guidelines.170
Existing MD&A requirements certainly leave room for expansion with
ESG disclosures. In fact, as discussed in a later section, the SEC has issued
guidance relating to ESG discussion under the existing MD&A regime.171
However, as pointed out herein, there are suggestions that this does not go
167. See Fisch, supra note 139, at 955.
168. See Fisch, supra note 139, at 955.
169. See Fisch, supra note 139, at 923. See also Jill E. Fisch,Making Sustainability
Disclosure Sustainable, 50 ENVTL. L. REP. 10638, 10643 (2020) (“[T]he SEC should reverse
its position that sustainability disclosure is not properly included within financial reporting.”).
See generally Rick A. Fleming & Alexandra M. Ledbetter,Making Mandatory Sustainability
Disclosure a Reality, 50 ENVTL. L. REP. 10647 (2020) (supporting mandatory disclosure);
Veena Ramani & Jim Coburn, The Need for SEC Rules on ESG Risk Disclosure, 50 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10650 (2020) (same); Thomas L. Riesenberg, Principles plus SASB Standards, 50
ENVTL. L. REP. 10653 (2020) (supporting principles and SASB standardization). But see
generally Sally R. K. Fisk & Nikki Adame-Winningham, Sustainability Risk Is Investment
Risk, 50 ENVTL. L. REP. 10644 (2020) (not supporting mandatory ESG disclosure).
170. It is beyond the scope of this article to draft a specific disclosure requirement.
171. See the discussion infra in the text accompanying note 240.
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far enough, and that ESG-related discussion should be required.
This principles-based approach to mandated disclosures would leave it
to companies to decide how to frame their CSR and ESG disclosures without
unduly exposing themselves to liability under the securities laws’ antifraud
provisions. 172 Violation of the existing MD&A discussion and analysis
requirements already exposes the company to possible SEC initiated
sanctions. However, invoking the antifraud rules to create the more serious
exposure to private rights of action for damages173 and potential criminal
liability174 requires a materiality threshold which is not required for an
MD&A violation.175 The antifraud provisions also impose a higher
culpability standard encompassed in the scienter176 requirement. Success in
an MD&A securities fraud claim requires showing that the company failed
to comply with MD&A requirements and further, that the nondisclosure or
misstatement was a material one.177 Even if the materiality threshold is
crossed, the scienter requirement limits liability to companies and their
agents who have made intentional or severely reckless statements or
omissions. Mere negligence in making the disclosures is not sufficient.178
172. See, e.g., Carvelli v. Ocwen Financial Corp., 934 F.3d 1307, 1331 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“Item 303 imposes a more sweeping disclosure obligation than Rule 10b-5, such that a
violation of the former does not ipso facto indicate a violation of the latter.”); Stratte-McClure
v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that although a violation of
Item 303 does not automatically rise to the level of a Rule 10b5 violation, “a violation of Item
303’s disclosure requirements can only sustain a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5
if the allegedly omitted information [also] satisfies Basic’s test for materiality”).
173. Private rights of action under SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011), are
discussed in 3-4 HAZEN, supra note 51, at 445.
174. See, e.g.,United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (criminal liability for insider
trading in violation of Rule 10b-5).
175. See the discussion of materiality supra in the text accompanying notes 67-103.
176. A violation of SEC Rule 10b-5 requires a showing of scienter which involves the
intent to deceive or acting with severe reckless disregard when making the challenged
statements. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007);
Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, (1976).
There are other liability provisions that can be based on negligence or even strict liability. See
e.g., Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (discussing liability for material misstatements and
omissions in 1933 Act registration statements). Even in a section 11 action, the plaintiff
would have to establish more than a violation of MD&A requirements and that the violations
rose to the level of material misstatements or omissions.
177. See, e.g., Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding
that a failure to make a required disclosure under Item 303 of Regulation S–K, 17 C.F.R. §
229.303(a)(3)(ii) is an omission that can serve as the basis for a Section 10(b) securities fraud
claim, if materiality requirement is satisfied).
178. The scienter requirement is spelled out in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, (1976). See also 3 HAZEN, supra note 51, §§ 12:50-12:58.
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As noted in the MD&A discussion above, not every discussion and analysis
violation crosses the securities laws’ materiality threshold. The section that
follows explores a parallel to the current code of ethics disclosure
requirement as an alternative to a CSR, ESG, or sustainability discussion and
analysis requirement.
4. Corporate Codes of Ethics and Governance
Another approach for mandating ESG disclosures would be to draw
from existing disclosure requirements with respect to corporate codes of
ethics. Under the SEC’s definition:
[T]he term code of ethics means written standards that are
reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing and to promote:
(1) Honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of
actual or apparent conflicts of interest between personal and
professional relationships;
(2) Full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in
reports and documents that a registrant files with, or submits to,
the Commission and in other public communications made by the
registrant;
(3) Compliance with applicable governmental laws, rules and
regulations;
(4) The prompt internal reporting of violations of the code to an
appropriate person or persons identified in the code; and
(5) Accountability for adherence to the code.179
Corporate codes of ethics and codes of conduct certainly are part of the
governance aspects of ESG.
Section 406 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act directed the SEC to develop
rules requiring disclosures relating to public companies’ codes of ethics.180
Neither the statute nor the SEC rules expressly mandate that a publicly held
company have a code of ethics,181 but the disclosure requirements clearly
provide a strong incentive to adopt a code.182 Companies without a code of
179. Regulation S-K item 406(b), 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(b).
180. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. Law 107–204 (July 30, 2002) § 406, codified in
15 U.S.C. § 1764.
181. In contrast to publicly held companies generally, an investment adviser who is
registered with the SEC under the Investment Adviser Act of 1940 is required to have a code
of ethics. Investment Adviser Act Rule 204A, 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1. See Investment
Adviser Code of Ethics, Inv. Adv. Act Rel. No. IA-2256, Inc. Co. Act Rel. No. IC-26492
(“S.E.C. July 2, 2004”), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2256.htm [https://perma.cc/5334-
4S8S].
182. A code of ethics should be designed to promote compliance with laws, rules, and
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ethics must disclose the absence of a code and explain the reasons for not
having one. 183 Also, companies that do not have a code of ethics will appear
out of line with the many companies that have adopted one.184 In disclosing
the code of ethics and its requirements, companies need to address
compliance with the code of ethics and applicable methods of assuring
compliance with the code.185
Following a strategy it has used before,186 the SEC does not directly
require that a company have a code of ethics. Instead, the company must
disclose whether it has a code of ethics in place.187 A similar requirement
could be imposed with respect to ESG generally. The discussion below
addresses existing requirements with respect to codes of ethics and the
possibility of applying a similar requirement for ESG generally.
Ethical conduct in corporate governance and conduct generally are key
regulations applicable to the company’s business. The code of ethics must identify
appropriate reporting procedures within the organization with respect to code violations.
183. SeeDisclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Securities Act Release No. 33-8177, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47235 (“S.E.C. Jan. 24,
2003”). See generally 3HAZEN, supra note 51, § 9:97 (discussing the code of ethics disclosure
requirement).
184. See Roberta Riva, The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron,
Sarbanes–Oxley, and the Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116HARV. L.REV. 2123,
2134–35 (2003) (“[P]ublic filing of codes, coupled with 8-K disclosures of waivers, will begin
a gradual process whereby the investing community will become sophisticated in evaluating
codes and distinguishing among them.”).
185. SeeDisclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-8177, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47235 (“S.E.C. Jan. 24, 2003”).
186. At one time, the SEC proposed requiring a fairness requirement for going private
transactions (a transaction that results in the cessation of Securities Exchange Act reporting
requirements). However, instead of requiring fairness, the SEC adopted a requirement that in
a going private transaction, management must make specified disclosures, including whether
management has a reasonable belief in the fairness of the transaction and the basis for such
belief. SEC Rule 133-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3. Thus, rather than require management to
address the transaction’s fairness, management has to disclose whether it has a belief that the
transaction is fair and if so, why. See Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or
Their Affiliates, Securities Act Release No. 33-6100, Exchange Act Release No. 34-16075,
Inv. Co. Act Rel. No. IC-10805, 44 Fed. Reg. 46736 (Aug. 8. 1979) (adopting Rule 13e-3);
Notice of Public Fact-Finding Investigation and Rulemaking Proceeding in the Matter of
“Going Private” Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Securities Act Release
No. 33-5568, Exchange Act Release No. 34-11231, Pub. Util. Holding Co. Act Rel. No. 35-
18805, Trust Indenture Act Rel. No. 39-380, Inv. Co. Act Rel. No. IC-8665, 6 S.E.C. Docket
272 (Feb. 6, 1975) (proposing Rule 13e-2 with a fairness requirement).
187. See Regulation S-K item 406(a), 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(a) (requiring that the company
must “[d]isclose whether the registrant has adopted a code of ethics that applies to
the registrant’s principal executive officer, principal financial officer, principal accounting
officer or controller, or persons performing similar functions. If the registrant has not adopted
such a code of ethics, explain why it has not done so”).
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components of any evaluation of a company’s governance. In terms of ESG,
codes of ethics can be a significant factor in evaluating a company’s
governance and governance structure.188 For example, most investors are
likely to want to avoid investing in companies with toxic corporate cultures.
As observed earlier, today’s environment and increased focus on diversity,
inclusion, and equity has spurred consumer activism and is likely to create
even more investor interest in avoiding companies with toxic corporate
cultures.
As explained above, the securities laws and SEC rules do not expressly
mandate that a publicly held company have a code of ethics,189 nor do they
mandate the specifics of how to draft a code of ethics.190 Nevertheless, the
188. See, e.g., Simon Webley & Andrea Werner, Corporate Codes of Ethics: Necessary
but not Sufficient, 17 BUS. ETHICS: AEUROPEANREV. 405, 405 (2008) (“[H]aving such a code
is generally regarded as the principal tool of a corporate ethics policy”). For an expanded
discussion of corporate codes of ethics, see generally HAZEN supra note 51. See also, e.g.,
Krista Bondy, Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, The Adoption of Voluntary Codes of Conduct in
MNCs: A Three‐Country Comparative Study, 109 BUS. & SOC. REV. 449, 449 (2004) (noting
that companies use “corporate responsibility (CSR) codes of conduct”); Patrick M. Erwin,
Corporate Codes of Conduct: The Effects of Code Content and Quality on Ethical
Performance, 99 J. BUS. ETHICS 535 (2011) (“Corporate codes of conduct are a practical
corporate social responsibility (CSR) instrument commonly used to govern employee
behavior and establish a socially responsible organizational culture.”).
189. In contrast to publicly held companies generally, an investment adviser who is
registered with the SEC under the Investment Adviser Act of 1940 is required to have a code
of ethics. Investment Adviser Act Rule 204A, 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1. See Investment
Adviser Code of Ethics, Inv. Adv. Act Rel. No. IA-2256, Inc. Co. Act Rel. No. IC-26492,
(S.E.C. July 2, 2004) https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2256.htm [https://perma.cc/6ZTX-P
EWU] (S.E.C. July 2, 2004). In addition, the New York Stock Exchange requires listed
companies to have codes of ethics. N.Y.S.E., Corporate Governance Listing Standards (Feb.
1, 2019), https://www.novonordisk.com/content/dam/nncorp/global/en/about-us/pdfs/corpor
ate-governance/NYSE-recommendations-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5GR-ALNX]:
Listed companies must adopt and disclose a code of business conduct and ethics
for directors, officers and employees, and promptly disclose any waivers of the
code for directors or executive officers. According to NYSE commentary a code





Protection and proper use of company assets.
Compliance with laws, rules and regulations (including insider trading laws).
Encouraging the reporting of any illegal or unethical behavior.
A similar requirement is imposed by the Nasdaq stock market. Nasdaq Stock Market Rule
5610.
190. As explained by the SEC:
We continue to believe that ethics codes do, and should, vary from company to
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disclosure requirements clearly provide a strong incentive for companies
without one to adopt a code. Companies without a code of ethics must
disclose the absence of a code of ethics and also explain the reasons for not
having one.191 Even before the SEC’s disclosure requirements, most publicly
held companies had codes of ethics or codes of conduct.192
As noted above, under the SEC rules, a “code of ethics” must include
“written standards that are reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing.”193 The
SEC has avoided providing specific guidance which gives companies the
flexibility they need in drafting company-specific codes.194 In addition, the
SEC does not explicitly require a company with a code of ethics to address
success or failure in complying with its code of ethics. However, applying
traditional materiality concepts, nondisclosure of conduct inconsistent with
a company’s code of ethics can cross the materiality threshold and therefore
be a material omission.195
As is the case with MD&A disclosures, violation of the code of ethics
disclosure requirement does not automatically translate into a violation of
the securities laws’ antifraud provisions. Investors have not frequently been
successful in stating fraud claims based on these disclosures. The difficulty
in establishing materially misleading disclosures regarding codes of ethics is
largely due to a corporation’s code of ethics being viewed as merely
company and that decisions as to the specific provisions of the code, compliance
procedures and disciplinary measures for ethical breaches are best left to the
company. Such an approach is consistent with our disclosure-based regulatory
scheme. Therefore, the rules do not specify every detail that the company must
address in its code of ethics, or prescribe any specific language that the code of
ethics must include. They further do not specify the procedures that the company
should develop, or the types of sanctions that the company should impose, to
ensure compliance with its code of ethics. We strongly encourage companies to
adopt codes that are broader and more comprehensive than necessary to meet the
new disclosure requirements.
Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Sec. Act
Rel. No. 33-8177, Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-47235, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110-01 (“S.E.C. Jan. 24,
2003”).
191. Regulation S-K item 406, 17 C.F.R. § 229.406. SeeDisclosure Required by Sections
406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-8177, Sec. Exch. Act
Rel. No. 34-47235 (“S.E.C. Jan. 24, 2003”). See generally 3 HAZEN, supra note 51, § 9:97
(discussing the code of ethics disclosure requirement).
192. As of 1998, over ninety percent of Fortune 500 companies were said to have adopted
codes of ethics or conduct. SeeMyrna Wulfson, Rules of the Game: Do Corporate Codes of
Ethics Work, 20 REV. BUS. 12, 12 (1998). As of 2013, ninety-five percent of Fortune 100
companies were identified as having a code of ethics.
193. Regulation S-K item 406, 17 C.F.R. §229.406.
194. Id.
195. See discussion in the text infra accompanying notes 197-207.
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aspirational rather than a statement as to the actual conduct of the company
and its employees.196 However, specific statements regarding the company’s
conduct can be materially misleading in light of a company’s code of
ethics.197 For example, in one case a corporation’s statements about its code
of ethics were held to be susceptible to a finding of material misstatements
for failing to disclose the company’s alleged participation in a bribery
scheme.198 However, in another case, the court found that the code of
conduct’s prohibition on bribery was merely aspirational.199
It remains true that generalized statements about a company’s
commitment to ethical conduct likely will be considered aspirational and
hence not materially misleading.200 However, as noted by the Sixth Circuit:
196. See, e.g., Retail Wholesale & Department Store Union Local 338 Retirement Fund v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 845 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that alleged sexual misconduct
of officer and alleged violation of ethics code was not material; the court noted that the
company’s statements promoting the company’s code of ethics “were transparently
aspirational” and “did not reasonably suggest that there would be no violations of [the code]
by the CEO or anyone else”); In re TransDigm Group Securities Litigation, 2020 WL 820823
(N.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2020) (quoting Bondali v. Yum! Brands, Inc., 620 Fed. Appx. 483, 490
(6th Cir. 2015)) (“‘[A] code of conduct is not a guarantee that a corporation will adhere to
everything set forth in its code of conduct’ and, instead, is simply a ‘declaration of corporate
aspirations.’”).
197. In re Banco Bradesco S.A. Securities Litigation, 277 F. Supp. 3d 600, 659 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (noting statements in code of ethics may have been aspirational, but “the context in
which the statements about Bradesco’s Code of Ethical Conduct and its other anti-corruption
statements were made persuades the Court that they are not to be treated as immaterial as a
matter of law at this stage of the litigation”). But cf. In re Sinclair Broadcast Group Inc.
Securities Litigation, 2020 WL 571724 (Del. Ch. Feb. 4, 2020) (stating failure to specifically
allege illegal conduct that violated company’s code of ethics).
198. In re Grupo Televisa Securities Litigation, 368 F. Supp. 3d 711 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(alleging sufficient material omissions from statements about code of ethics in light of in
nondisclosure of company’s participation in bribery scheme).
199. Ulbricht v. Ternium S.A., 2020 WL 5517313 at * 9 ( E.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting In re
Braskem S.A. Securities Litigation, 246 F. Supp. 3d 731, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) and citing In
re PetroChina Co. Ltd. Securities Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 3d 340, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2015))
(showing a code of conduct prohibition against bribery was aspirational did not imply that
company’s officers did not engage in bribery, noting “[t]here is an important difference
between a company’s announcing rules forbidding bribery and its factually representing that
no officer has engaged in such forbidden conduct”).
200. Das v. Rio Tinto PLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 786, 806–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting
statements about code of ethics were immaterial); Employees Retirement System of City of
Providence v. Embraer S.A., 2018 WL 1725574, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018) (stating
conduct inconsistent with code of ethics was not material since code was aspirational); SEC
v. Kovzan, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1042 (D. Kans. 2011) (“NIC stated only that it had adopted
a code, that all employees were required to follow it, and that any waivers would be disclosed
on the company’s website. NIC did not suggest thereby that there had been no violations or
waivers”). As explained by the Second Circuit:
It is well-established that general statements about reputation, integrity, and
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This is not to say that statements about a company’s reputation for
integrity or ethical conduct can never give rise to a securities
violation. Some statements, in context, may amount to more than
“puffery” and may in some circumstances violate the securities
laws: for example, a company’s specific statements that emphasize
its reputation for integrity or ethical conduct as central to its
financial condition or that are clearly designed to distinguish the
company from other specified companies in the same industry.201
In addition to generalized statements likely being viewed as purely
aspirational, generalized statements regarding corporate codes are very
susceptible to being characterized as vague generalities202 and puffery203
rather than material representations of fact.204 Courts often find statements
about a company’s code of ethics and accompanying ethical corporate
culture to be mere puffery.205
compliance with ethical norms are inactionable puffery, meaning that they are
too general to cause a reasonable investor to rely upon them. This is particularly
true where . . . statements are explicitly aspirational, with qualifiers such as “aims
to,” “wants to,” and “should.”
City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement System v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 185
(2d Cir. 2014); In re Vale S.A. Securities Litigation, 2020 WL 2610979 at *10 (E.D.N.Y.
2020). See also, e.g., Kushner v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 317 F.3d 820, 831 (8th Cir. 2003)
(“Absent a clear allegation that the defendants knew of the scheme and its illegal nature at the
time they stated the belief that the company was in compliance with the law, there is nothing
further to disclose.”).
201. Indiana Public Retirement System v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85, 98 (6th Cir. 2016)
(holding that the statements in question were too generalized to be material).
202. See, e.g., Rex & Roberta Ling Living Trust U/A December 6, 1990 v. BV
Communications, Ltd., 346 F. Supp. 3d 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting statements in company’s
code of ethics were “vague platitudes” and thus not materially misleading).
203. Carvelli v. Ocwen Financial Corp., 934 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding
statements regarding progress the company was making toward state regulatory compliance
were puffery); Barilli v. Sky Solar Holdings, Ltd., 389 F. Supp. 3d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(holding statements in prospectus regarding company’s code of ethics were mere puffery).
204. On the other hand, as noted earlier, the SEC has indicated that management integrity
is always likely to be material. In the Matter of Franchard Corp., 423 S.E.C. 163, 172 (1964);
see the discussion supra accompanying note 15. Thus, to the extent that code of ethics or
code of conduct discussions implicate management integrity, there is a greater likelihood that
they will be deemed material.
205. See, e.g., Singh v. Cigna Corporation, 918 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2019) (noting statements
in corporation’s code of ethics expressing its commitment to regulatory compliance were
puffery and could not support securities fraud claims); Sinclair Broadcast Group Securities
Litigation, 2020 WL 571724 (D. Md. 2020) (“[S]tatements in corporate codes of conduct can
be characterized as inactionable ‘puffery’: statements of a company’s ideals rather than
representations of past or present fact.”); Barilli v. Sky Solar Holdings, Ltd., 389 F. Supp. 3d
232 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (holding statements in prospectus regarding company’s code of ethics
were mere puffery and thus not actionable); Lopez v. CTPartners, 173 F. Supp. 3d 12, 28–29
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Forty-five years ago, an SEC official cautioned against defining
materiality too broadly:
Materiality is a concept that will bear virtually any burden; it can
justify almost any disclosure; it can be expanded all but limitlessly.
But we must constantly bear in mind that overloading it, unduly
burdening it, excessively expanding it, may result in significant
changes in the role of the Commission, the role of other
enforcement agencies, and our ability to carry out our statutory
duties.206
The concern over an overly broad definition of materiality still
resonates today. An overly inclusive approach with respect to codes of ethics
would, in essence, punish companies for adopting a code of ethics.207
Accordingly, the courts must strive for a delicate balance in applying
materiality principles without deterring adoption of codes of ethics
altogether.
Unfortunately, the uncertainty regarding materiality is palpable,
especially since there is inconsistency in the case law. For example, lawsuits
have been brought based on claims that omission of sexual harassment or
misconduct were material in light of the company’s code of ethics. Some
claims have been dismissed,208 while others have survived the materiality
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding statements about the code of ethics and ethical corporate culture
were immaterial puffery); Cement & Concrete Workers District Council Pension Fund v.
Hewlett Packard Company, 964 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (Noting CEO’s
misconduct and firing did not render company’s code of ethics which he violated materially
misleading). See also, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 779 (9th Cir. 1981)
(“[D]irector misconduct of the type traditionally regulated by state corporate law need not be
disclosed in proxy solicitations for director elections.”); Kooker v. Baker, 2020 WL 6287248
at *4 (D. Del. 2020) (quoting Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 639 (3d Cir.
1989)) (“[A]llegations of failure to disclose mismanagement alone do not state a claim under
federal securities law.”).
206. A.A. Sommer, The Slippery Slope of Materiality, SEC (Dec. 8, 1975), https://www.s
ec.gov/news/speech/1975/120875sommer.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6ZV-HQMU]. See also,
e.g.,Hester Peirce, Statement on Proposed Amendments to Modernize and Enhance Financial
Disclosures, quoted supra note 149.
207. See, e.g., Ferris v. Wynn Resorts, 2020 WL 2748309 at *14 (D. Nev. 2020) (quoting
Andropolis v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 662, 686 (D. Colo. 2007))
(“[I]t simply cannot be that every time a violation of that code [of conduct] occurs, a company
is liable under federal law for having chosen to adopt the code at all, particularly when the
adoption of such a code is effectively mandatory.”).
208. See, e.g., Retail Wholesale & Department Store Union Local 338 Retirement Fund v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 845 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding omissions were not material);
Oklahoma Law Enforcement Retirement System v. Papa John’s International, Inc., 2021 WL
371401 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (holding that failure to adequately allege company had affirmative
duty to disclose information about alleged sexual misconduct).
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threshold.209 Further, allegations of omitting to disclose that the company
had a pervasive culture enabling sexual harassment were found immaterial
in one case, with the court describing the statements about the code as
“quintessential puffery.”210 In contrast, in another case from the same federal
district, the court found that similar allegations were capable of being
considered materially misleading.211 If a corporate culture contrary to the
code of ethics involves serious misconduct, that misconduct could result in
the wrongdoer’s dismissal or forced resignation.212 Regardless of whether a
company has a code of ethics, if those wrongdoers are high profile, then
nondisclosure of conduct that could lead to their dismissal or resignation
could well be a material omission.213 In other contexts, omission of facts
likely to impact a CEO’s or other high profile manager’s longevity with a
company may be recognized as material.214
209. In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Securities Litigation, 389 F. Supp. 3d 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(denying defendant’s motion to dismiss).
210. Oklahoma Law Enforcement Retirement System v. Papa John’s International, Inc.,
2020 WL 1243808 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2020) (holding statements regarding the company’s
code of ethics were not materially misleading notwithstanding alleged corporate culture
enabling sexual harassment). But cf. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern
California v. CBS Corp., 2020 WL 248729 at *13–*15 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (holding that
although company had no duty to disclose CEO’s alleged misconduct as part of its MD&A or
risk factors discussion, CEO’s statements about the #MeToo movement and specific denials
of sexual misconduct were materially misleading in light of his alleged misconduct).
211. In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Securities Litigation, 389 F. Supp. 3d 221, 226 (S.D.N.Y.
2019) (quoting In reMoody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 508 (S.D.N.Y.)) (holding
that statements in company’s code of conduct were not mere puffery with regard to company’s
alleged pervasive culture of sexual harassment; defendant’s motion to dismiss denied; the
court noted, “While generalized, open-ended or aspirational statements do not give rise to
securities fraud (as mere puffery), statements contained in a code of conduct are actionable
where they are directly at odds with the conduct alleged in a complaint”).
212. For example, there was a scathing expose in the New York Times about rampant
sexual harassment at Victoria’s Secret. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Katherine Rosman,
Sapna Maheshwari & James B. Stewart, “Angels” in Hell: The Culture of Misogyny Inside
Victoria’s Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/01/business
/victorias-secret-razek-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/4K35-4CH2]. Once the news of the
company’s toxic culture was exposed, the longtime CEO relinquished control. See Sapna
Maheshwari, Embattled L Brands Appoints Sarah Nash as Chair, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/business/l-brands-sarah-nash-les-wexner.html
[https://perma.cc/XT6N-JNVE]; Ed Hammond & Jonathan Roeder, Wexner Said in Talks to
Step Down, Break Up L Brands, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.c
om/news/articles/2020-01-29/victoria-s-secret-owner-jumps-on-report-wexner-may-sell-bra
nd [https://perma.cc/A6ES-YHKG].
213. Cf. In the Matter of Franchard Corp., 423 S.E.C. 163 (1964) (stating CEO’s pledges
of his own stock was material since foreclosure on those pledges could lead to a change in the
company’s management).
214. For example, the SEC investigated whether Apple’s delayed disclosure of Steve Jobs’
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Even apart from the company’s code of ethics, a toxic corporate culture
may provide a basis for shareholder suits. Paralleling the challenges to
corporate conduct under the securities laws, a recent tactic of plaintiffs has
been to challenge a toxic corporate culture and sexual harassment under state
law. For example, in one recent filing, a shareholder sought access to a
company’s books and records relating to alleged widespread sexual
harassment within the company and suspected companion breaches of
fiduciary duty.215 If turned over to the requesting shareholder, the company’s
books and records might well provide sufficient specific conduct that could
form the basis of a securities law claim for material omissions of fact.
Even though ESG disclosures may not be sufficiently material to result
in liability for false statements, they do provide investors with important
ESG discussion in a company’s disclosures. Thus, even though
noncompliance in many cases would not result in liability, mandating ESG
disclosures by following the pattern currently used for corporate codes of
ethics can provide investors with important information without creating
significant risks of civil liability for violations. Accordingly, fashioning a
similar requirement for companies to disclose the extent of a commitment, if
any, to ESG principles would provide useful information without subjecting
companies to undue litigation risks. This can be seen as a variation of the
“comply or explain” approach to disclosure that has been used by the United
Kingdom and other countries in their public reporting requirements.216
The existing disclosure requirement relating to codes of ethics
addresses only the “G” in ESG and leaves out sustainability issues. Going
beyond the existing code of ethics disclosure requirement would be
cancer violated the securities laws. See, e.g., Staci D. Kramer, Apple Being Investigated by
SEC Over Way Steve Jobs’ Health Handled? It Should Be, CBS NEWS (Jan. 21, 2009), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/apple-being-investigated-by-sec-over-way-jobs-health-handled-it-
should-be/ [https://perma.cc/285C-FL7L]. See also, e.g., Susan S. Muck, David A. Bell &
Michael S. Dicke, Best Practices for Disclosing Executive Health Issues, HARV. L. SCH.
FORUM ONCORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 8, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/08/b
est-practices-for-disclosing-executive-health-issues/ [https://perma.cc/BXT6-9SRV].
215. See Jeff Montgomery, Investor Sues Victoria’s Secret Parent Over “Toxic Culture,”
LAW 360 (June 4, 2020) https://www.law360.com/delaware/articles/1280141/investor-sues-v
ictoria-s-secret-parent-over-toxic-culture-?nl_pk=d8e8e675-b3ae-488e-b86a-15d04b0b8d13
&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=delaware [https://perma.cc
/S9N3-7Z6D] (seeking corporate records relating to “alleged ‘toxic culture’ of sexual
harassment and intimidation”). The complaint alleges breaches of fiduciary duty by the
company’s directors and a lack of director independence from the company founder, chairman
and CEO.
216. See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, “Comply or Explain” and the Future of Financial
Reporting, 21 LEWIS&CLARK L. REV. 317 (2017) (discussing comply or explain disclosure
as it applies to nonfinancial disclosures and urging the U.S. adopt this approach for ESG).
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beneficial with respect to ESG disclosures generally. For example,
borrowing from the code of ethics disclosure requirement, the SEC could
mandate that companies disclose their ESG and social responsibility
generally, and to describe the company’s approach. Specifically, this could
include a statement as to the ways in which the company uses ESG factors
or metrics in its decision making.
A stand-alone mandate that companies address ESG more generally
would not impose overly burdensome disclosures, nor would it expose
companies to undue litigation risk. As is currently the case with code of
ethics disclosures, requiring a company to state whether it has ESG policies
or guidelines would allow the company to fashion its own approach to ESG
consistent with the approach taken by the current voluntary disclosure
regime.
5. Proposal for an ESG Safe Harbor Rule to Encourage Voluntary
Disclosure
The various proposals for mandatory disclosure that are discussed
above have considerable merit. There is no doubt that some form of
mandatory disclosure would help improve CSR and ESG disclosures.
However, the SEC has been very slow to respond to the supporters calling
for mandatory disclosure. Also, as discussed above, crafting a mandated
ESG disclosure regime has its detractors and could be problematic in
formulating the specifics of the disclosure requirements. Nevertheless, the
advocates for mandatory disclosure appear to have the better case. In the
event that mandatory disclosure is not on the horizon for the foreseeable
future, this article suggests that an effective way to encourage ESG
disclosures, short of a disclosure mandate, would be for the SEC to adopt a
safe harbor rule. Such an ESG safe harbor rule would be consistent with the
securities laws’ approach with respect to forward-looking statements and
projections.217 Additionally, having a safe harbor rule in place would be
advisable even if mandatory disclosures are adopted. The safe harbor would
help mitigate against litigation risks that could otherwise arise out of a
mandatory CSR and ESG disclosure regime.
Over the years, the SEC has adopted many interpretative rules. Unlike
the SEC rules promulgated pursuant to specific statutory delegation,218
217. See generally 3 HAZEN supra note 51 §§12:71-12:75 (discussing safe harbors and the
bespeaks caution doctrine that can minimize liability exposure for forward-looking
statements).
218. The SEC’s general antifraud prohibition in Rule 10b-5 is one such example. 17
C.F.R. § 1240.10b-5.
788 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 23:3
interpretative rules do not carry the force of law. Instead, interpretive rules
simply reflect the Commission’s interpretation of the law created by the
statute.219 A distinct variety of SEC interpretative rules are the safe harbor
rules.220 A safe harbor rule establishes conditions under which the SEC will
take the position that the law has been complied with, and therefore will not
bring an enforcement action. Compliance with the requirements of a safe
harbor rule will thus assure that those who comply are safe from SEC
prosecution with regard to the disclosures or transactions in question. The
rules are designed to help provide for certainty in planning transactions in
order to comply with the applicable securities laws. Safe harbor rules thus
provide some certainty for instances in which the statute and case law
otherwise could lead to uncertainty. Safe harbor rules have been described
as a way to address general principles and provide a degree of objectivity.221
ESG disclosures arise in a climate where statements of principles and
objectivity are welcome. A safe harbor rule premised on good faith and
having a reasonable basis for the statements made is not the sole way to
comply with the law but rather provides a path to safety. The existence of a
safe harbor rule, in turn, encourages transactions that conform to the
parameters set out in the rule – in this case, ESG disclosures based on good
faith and reasonable basis.
In the 1970s, the SEC made the determination that forward-looking
statements can benefit investors.222 This represented an about-face from the
SEC’s former position discouraging projections of future economic
performance.223 The change in position on forward-looking statements was
triggered in large part by investors’ interest in receiving such information,224
219. See generally 1 HAZEN supra note 51 §§ 1:30-1:33 (discussing various approaches to
SEC rulemaking).
220. Examples of SEC safe harbor rules include Rule 144 (exemption for secondary
transactions), Rule 147 (exemption for intrastate offerings), Rule 175 (forward-looking
statements), and 506 (exemption for offerings by an issuer not involving a public offering),
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144, 230.147, 230.175, 230.506.
221. Andrew Stumpff Morrison, Case Law, Systematic Law, and a Very Modest
Suggestion, 35 STATUTEL.REV. 159, 162 (2013). See also Isaac Ehrlich &Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
222. See, e.g., Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance,
Exchange Act Release 33-5992, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,246 (Nov. 7, 1978) (detailing the SEC’s
rationale for favoring forward-looking statements).
223. See, e.g., A.A. Sommer Jr. et al., New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered
Security Offerings, 28 BUS. LAW. 505, 529–30 (1973) (supporting the SEC’s opposition to
forward-looking statements).
224. See, e.g., Guides for Disclosure, supra note 222; Homer Kripke, The SEC, The
Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1151, 1197–99 (1970)
(supporting forward-looking statements).
2021] SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE SPOTLIGHT 789
much in the same way investors today support better CSR and ESG
disclosures. In response to similar investor interest, the SEC adopted the
safe harbor rules to encourage companies to make forward-looking
statements.225 These rules, which have since been codified by Congress,226
provide that forward-looking statements made in good faith with a
reasonable basis will not be actionable.227
The rationale for adopting the safe harbor rule was that investors
consider forward-looking statements important, and rather than mandate
such disclosures, the SEC opted to simply encourage them.228 An ESG safe
harbor could go even further and define specific steps a company can take to
insulate their ESG disclosures from litigation risks. For example, in addition
to generally protecting ESG disclosures made in good faith and having a
reasonable basis, the safe harbor could include some of the steps outlined in
the SEC guidelines discussed in the next section. For example, the rule could
also include and protect metrics that comply with the terms of existing SEC
guidance on metrics and ESG.229 SEC inclusion of specific guidance in the
safe harbor would provide companies with a meaningful roadmap to ESG
compliance. This would be preferable to limiting the suggested ESG safe
harbor to the general provisions found in the forward-looking statement safe
harbor that have been criticized as too general to provide meaningful help to
companies crafting forward-looking statements.230
Creating a stand-alone ESG safe harbor following the SEC pattern for
forward-looking statements would simultaneously provide protection for
statements and show the SEC’s desire to encourage ESG disclosures.
However, this could be somewhat of an illusory protection since the general
nature of the rule could still generate litigation over what is a reasonable
basis and what constitutes good faith.231 With respect to safe harbor rules
generally, a chief advantage is the ability to combine a statement of general
principles with specifically identified means for complying with the rule. As
225. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175, 240.3b-6.
226. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5.
227. Id.
228. Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6084, 44 Fed. Reg.
38,810 (July 2, 1979).
229. See, e.g., Commission Guidance, supra note 65 at 4 (setting forth specific
recommendations).
230. See, e.g., Allan Horwich, Cleaning the Murky Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking
Statements: An Inquiry into Whether Actual Knowledge of Falsity Precludes the Meaningful
Cautionary Statement Defense, 35 J. CORP. L. 519, 523–34 (2010) (discussing how the
generalized safe harbor was supplemented by the more specific protection for forward-
looking statements with sufficient cautionary language).
231. The safe harbor for forward-looking statements has been criticized on this basis. See
id.
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pointed out by one observer:
The safe-harbor formulation is at least potentially a way of
combining the opposed advantages of generality and
objectivity. . . . At the same time the rule-writer can identify the
specific situations expected to arise most frequently, and address
them with specifically tailored, objective safe-harbor (or unsafe-
harbor) rules. Those objective rules can be written to avoid at least
the most foreseeable hard cases associated with objective
guidelines (“emergency vehicles on official business are permitted
in the park”), and anything falling outside safe-harbor contours can
be left to be captured by the standard. The safe and unsafe harbors
are analogous to the specific cases – factual scenarios – for which
judicial answers have been provided under a caselaw system. Safe-
harbor-based rule systems could be regarded as a kind of
“synthetic case law;” they are like writing case law in advance,
and including it within a systematic law structure.
Safe harbor systems offer the possibility of preserving
accessibility without sacrificing either completeness, on one hand,
or objective criteria for most fact patterns, on the other.232
The goal of combining general principles with specific guidance was
accomplished to some extent in the context of securities disclosure when
Congress supplemented the reasonable basis and good faith requirements by
establishing that sufficient cautionary language can protect forward-looking
statements.233 In the ESG context, a cautionary statement that the goals are
aspirational could have the same impact.
Since an increasing number of investors have shown interest in ESG-
related disclosures, it would be appropriate for the SEC to adopt some type
of safe harbor rule to encourage such disclosures made in good faith and with
a reasonable basis. The good faith and reasonable basis requirements would
232. Morrison, supra note 221 at 14–15.
233. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5. This is known as the bespeaks caution doctrine that was
developed in the case law and then incorporated into the statutory safe harbors. E.g., Carvelli
v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 934 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that sufficient cautionary
language precluded securities claim); Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan
v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that extensive specifically tailored cautionary
language precluded a finding of materiality). For some of the cases that preceded the statutory
safe harbors see, e.g., In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir.
1994); Kline v. First Western Government Securities, Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994);
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Donald J. Trump Casino, 7 F.3d 357
(3d Cir. 1993); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1991). For
commentary on the bespeaks caution doctrine, see, e.g., Horwich, supra note 78; Jennifer
O’Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: It’s not Just a State of Mind, 58 U.
PITT. L. REV. 619 (1997).
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provide adequate protection against liability for material misstatements. The
safe harbor would thus have a significant impact by effectively encouraging
disclosures without unduly exposing the company to risks of liability.234
As noted above, the securities laws’ materiality concept makes
meaningful specific guidance difficult. The necessarily vague nature of the
SEC guidance, including the guidance specifically addressing ESG and
metrics,235makes it difficult for companies to have confidence in their ability
to draft compliant ESG disclosures. As the sole benchmark for when to
discuss, ESG creates challenges in drafting since, with its fact-specific
nature, materiality alone provides no real guidance.
The challenges in drafting ESG disclosures warrant implementation of
a safe harbor rule along the lines of the one suggested herein. This would
encourage such disclosures by limiting the litigation risks associated thereto.
It is important to note that while a safe harbor rule limits litigation risk, it
does not eliminate the risk completely—nor should it. If a company does
not comply with the good faith and reasonable basis components of the
suggested rule, then the disclosures should be subject to antifraud scrutiny
with respect to material inaccuracies.
The advisability of an ESG-related safe harbor rule is not limited to the
current regime under which ESG disclosures are voluntary. As noted earlier,
a mandatory disclosure requirement would help eliminate some of the
problems that exist in the current voluntary disclosure environment. If the
SEC opts for some version of mandatory ESG disclosures, the safe harbor
rule suggested herein would be a valuable companion to encourage better
disclosures without placing undue burdens on publicly held companies. The
difficulty in crafting CSR and ESG disclosures and determining materiality
justify a safe harbor rule to mitigate the litigation risks that could arise with
the implementation of either a mandatory or voluntary CSR and ESG
disclosure regime.
C. Encouraging Voluntary Disclosure with SEC Guidelines
Another approach that could be combined with a safe harbor rule or
implemented without one is to continue the current regime under which ESG
disclosures are voluntary, with the SEC providing guidance as to the content
of ESG disclosures for companies that elect to do so.236 The SEC has taken
234. See, e.g., Novick et al., supra note 128 at 9 (recommending a safe harbor for ESG
disclosures).
235. See the discussion infra in the text accompanying notes 241-243.
236. See, e.g., Keith F. Higgins, et al., The SEC and Improving Sustainability Reporting,
29 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 22 (2017) (discussing improving ESG disclosures with improved
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some steps in this direction. As noted above, the SEC has encouraged
companies to make a materiality assessment with regard to ESG issues.237
However, due to the fact-based approach for making materiality
determinations, the SEC guidance does not offer bright-line instructions.
If the company elects to make CSR and ESG-related disclosures, it must
keep materiality considerations in mind. When making voluntary
disclosures under the securities laws, the choice is either full disclosure or
no disclosure. A company cannot simply pick and choose to disclose the
good about its ESG compliance and at the same time ignore inconsistent
conduct. As discussed earlier, materiality considerations prevent making a
statement and omitting inconsistent material facts.
The ESG guidance given by the SEC clearly encourages companies to
make sustainability-related disclosures. For example, in 2019, the SEC
issued a memorandum regarding sustainability-related disclosures.238
Among other things, the SEC explained:
Disclosures should also be accompanied by a management
approach which describes the management of material
sustainability issues. This includes explaining how the
organization (1) avoids, mitigates, or remediates negative impacts
to the economy, environment, and society, and enhances positive
ones, and (2) addresses its climate-related issues. The management
approach also includes an assessment of material risks and
opportunities associated with sustainability, management and
oversight of such opportunities and risks at the highest level of the
organization and performance assessment, using key performance
indicators. These approaches can be in the form of organization
policies, commitments, goals and targets, responsibilities,
resources, grievance mechanisms as well as processes, projects,
programs, and initiatives. See GRI 103 for more guidance on the
management approach.239
In 2020, the SEC issued guidance for ESG metrics discussion in
connection with MD&A disclosures.240 This guidance recognizes that there
are many approaches to ESG metrics, and thus reinforces the lack of
universal standardization in the ESG provider industry. The guidance goes
on to suggest that in making ESG disclosures, the company should explain
the basis of the metrics used:
guidance).
237. SEC, supra note 94, at 16 (2019).
238. SEC, supra note 94, at 16 (2019).
239. SEC, supra note 94, at 16 (2019).
240. Commission Guidance, supra note 65.
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We would generally expect, based on the facts and circumstances, the
following disclosures to accompany the metric:
• A clear definition of the metric and how it is calculated;
• A statement indicating the reasons why the metric provides
useful information to investors; and
• A statement indicating how management uses the metric in
managing or monitoring the performance of the business.
The company should also consider whether there are estimates or
assumptions underlying the metric or its calculation, and whether disclosure
of such items is necessary for the metric not to be materially misleading.241
The SEC’s 2020 guidance certainly is helpful for companies electing to
make ESG-related disclosures. Further, the SEC’s guidance on the use of
metrics supports the use of both qualitative and quantitative ESG
discussion.242 The guidance regarding metrics generally indicates that some
voluntary ESG disclosures will require both qualitative and quantitative
analysis.243 The SEC also reminds companies of the general requirement for
disclosures that mandate a company have a system in place that establishes
effective controls to assure accuracy in disclosure.244 The SEC further
241. Commission Guidance, supra note 65at 4. See, e.g., Lee T. Barnham, Donna Mussio
&Mary Beth Houloihan, Potential Impact of New SEC Guidance on Performance Metrics on
Disclosure of ESG Metrics, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ONCORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 6, 2020), ht
tps://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/06/potential-impact-of-new-sec-guidance-on-perfor
mance-metrics-on-disclosure-of-esg-metrics/ [https://perma.cc/Y3K8-EZUT] (“The Metrics
Guidance provides that public companies disclosing metrics (whether financial or non-
financial) in MD&A should consider whether additional disclosure is necessary to ensure that
such metrics are not misleading, and further reminds companies to maintain disclosure
controls and procedures with respect to such metrics. Although public reporting companies
typically disclose environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) metrics in voluntary
sustainability reports, some companies also disclose certain key ESG data in their Exchange
Act filings. Companies that choose to disclose such ESG performance data in their MD&A
should be mindful of the Metrics Guidance going forward.”).
242. Commission Guidance supra note 65 at 3 n.7 (“The company should provide a
narrative that enables investors to see a company ‘through the eyes of management,’ so these
metrics should not deviate materially from metrics used to manage operations or make
strategic decisions.”).
243. See, e.g., Lee Barnum, Donna Mussio & Mary Beth Houilihan, Will the New SEC
Guidance on Performance Metrics Impact Disclosure of ESG Metrics, 24 WALL. ST. LAW. 9,
11 (Mar. 2020) (“While the Metrics Guidance addresses ESG metrics only via footnote, it is
consistent with the recommendations in certain voluntary sustainability frameworks that
require both qualitative and quantitative disclosure associated with ESG metrics.”).
244. The SEC generally requires companies to have procedures and controls in place to
assure compliance with the securities laws’ disclosure requirements. See Rules 13a-15; Rule
15d-15, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-15, 240.15d-15. As explained by the SEC:
Pursuant to Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 and 15d-15, a company’s principal
executive officer and principal financial officer must make certifications
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emphasizes that this is especially important for both generalized CSR and
more metrics-driven ESG-related disclosures.245
Some of the SEC’s earlier guidance is quite lengthy, making it more
difficult to identify specific guidance for companies when drafting their ESG
disclosures.246 Over ten years ago, the SEC issued guidance on climate
change disclosures which, among other things, noted that climate change
issues could become a known trend or uncertainty that would trigger an
MD&A discussion.247 That interpretative release also highlighted the
difficulty of making materiality determinations in this regard.248 Additional
specific SEC guidance would be welcome. In fact, one SEC Commissioner
criticized the Commission for not making more strides in trying to improve
climate change disclosures.249
Presumably, companies that follow SEC guidelines will, to some
extent, minimize litigation risks that are tied to ESG. However, the
adherence to SEC guidelines does not provide the more reliable protection
that would follow by incorporating the disclosure guidelines into a safe
regarding the maintenance and effectiveness of disclosure controls and
procedures. These rules define “disclosure controls and procedures” as those
controls and procedures designed to ensure that information required to be
disclosed by the company in the reports that it files or submits under the
Exchange Act is (1) “recorded, processed, summarized and reported, within the
time periods specified in the Commission’s rules and forms,” and (2)
“accumulated and communicated to the company’s management . . . as
appropriate to allow timely decisions regarding required disclosure.”
Commission Guidance, supra note 65, at 5 n. 12.
245. Commission Guidance, supra note 65, at 5 (“Effective controls and procedures are
important when disclosing material key performance indicators or metrics that are derived
from the company’s own information. When key performance indicators and metrics are
material to an investment or voting decision, the company should consider whether it has
effective controls and procedures in place to process information related to the disclosure of
such items to ensure consistency as well as accuracy.”).
246. For example, SEC, supra note 94 contains useful information but is 47 pages long.
247. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, supra note
163.
248. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, supra note
163, at 17–18.
249. Statement of Allison Herren Lee, Commissioner, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n,
“Modernizing” Regulation S-K: Ignoring the Elephant in the Room (Jan. 30, 2020), https://w
ww.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-mda-2020-01-30 [https://perma.cc/3VNE-XABK]
(“The Commission last addressed climate change disclosure in 2010. In that guidance we
identified four existing items in Regulation S-K that may require disclosure related to climate
change: description of business, legal proceedings, risk factors, and management’s discussion
and analysis of financial condition and results of operations, or MD&A. We have now
proposed to “modernize” every one of these four items without mentioning climate change or
even asking a single question about its relevance to these disclosures.”) (footnote omitted).
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harbor rule. As discussed in the previous section of this article, it would be
even more helpful if the SEC were to incorporate these guidelines into a safe
harbor rule.
The most recent SEC developments impacting ESG disclosures can be
found in its recent amendments to Regulation S-K’s disclosure
requirements.250 For example, companies must make disclosures relating to
the workplace environment and human capital that are material to investors.
Unfortunately, while highlighting the work environment, the disclosure
mandate is based on the amorphous materiality threshold, instead of taking
a more proactive approach to encouraging disclosures relating to the S in
ESG.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The SEC’s existing disclosure requirements for issues relating to
environmental, social, and governance considerations provide investors with
some useful information. However, the existing required disclosures do not
provide the more holistic approach to ESG issues that investors want. The
increasing investor interest in ESG disclosures is undeniable. Publicly held
companies in the U.S. are continuing to face increased pressure to make
meaningful ESG disclosures and there is no indication that this momentum
is likely to subside. ESG disclosures, including metrics, can be problematic
in large part due to the unpredictable nature of identifying materiality. The
current landscape consists of voluntary ESG disclosures and the SEC has
issued some guidance for companies in framing these disclosures. However,
the efforts to date do not go far enough. The SEC announced plans to
increase its focus on climate-related disclosures.251 This increased SEC
focus on ESG should consider the recommendations made in this article in
general, and in particular, the adoption of a safe harbor rule to further
encourage ESG disclosures.
The SEC should do more to encourage meaningful ESG disclosures. A
key component to encouraging companies to make ESG disclosures is the
safe harbor rule suggested by this article. Many observers believe that the
250. See Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33-10825; 34-89670, 2020 WL 5076727 (Aug. 26, 2020) (implementing a
principles-based approach to various disclosure requirements).
251. See, e.g., Statement of Acting SEC Chair Allison Herren Lee on the Review of
Climate-Related Disclosure, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-statement-revie
w-climate-related-disclosure [https://perma.cc/QMN6-8Y6D] (Feb. 24, 2021) (directing the
Division of Corporation Finance to enhance its focus on climate-related disclosure in public
company filings).
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SEC should go further and mandate ESG disclosure. This article has
analyzed various approaches to mandatory disclosure. One approach
discussed above is an ESG discussion and analysis approach similar to the
MD&A requirement. Another approach would be to follow the pattern that
is used for corporate codes of ethics and require companies to disclose
whether they have ESG policies, and if so, what they are. Both of these seem
to be viable approaches if the SEC elects to pursue mandatory disclosures,
as many have called for.
The foregoing analysis identifies and explains a number of ways in
which the SEC could enhance CSR and ESG disclosures. This article
supports the suggestions mentioned above that would encourage or require
CSR and ESG disclosures. However, as discussed earlier, there are
arguments against requiring ESG disclosures rather than continuing the
current system of the SEC encouraging voluntary disclosure. Regardless of
whether the SEC institutes some form of mandatory CSR and ESG
disclosure, it should strengthen its encouragement of voluntary disclosures.
One way to do this would be to provide more guidance as to how to improve
and standardize ESG disclosures. This article recommends that regardless
of whether the SEC adopts some form of mandatory disclosures or takes
other steps to encourage more meaningful voluntary disclosure, the SEC
should adopt a safe harbor rule. As suggested herein, the safe harbor rule
would minimize litigation risk from ESG disclosures by providing that no
liability would result from ESG-related disclosures made in good faith and
having a reasonable basis.
A safe harbor rule would promote meaningful ESG disclosure while
minimizing, but not eliminating, liability risks resulting from deficient
disclosures. In the event the SEC is persuaded to adopt mandatory CSR and
ESG disclosures, a safe harbor rule will provide protection against undue
litigation risk resulting from those disclosures. Consequently, whether as the
sole response or as a supplement to other SEC initiatives, the SEC should
adopt a safe harbor rule for CSR and ESG disclosures.
